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ENDORSING AFTER DEATH

ANDREW GILDEN*
ABSTRACT
An endorsement is an act of giving one’s public support to a person, product, service, or cause; accordingly, it might seem impossible
for someone to make an endorsement after they have died. Nevertheless, posthumous endorsements have become commonplace in social
media marketing and have been increasingly embraced by trademark
and unfair competition laws. Entities representing Marilyn Monroe,
for example, have successfully brought trademark claims for the unauthorized use of Monroe’s name, have successfully brought false
endorsement claims under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and
regularly have promoted products through the Instagram-verified
“@marilynmonroe” page. Marilyn Monroe survives today as a highly
paid celebrity endorser even though she died almost sixty years ago
and her “estate” is controlled by individuals without any personal
connection to her.
This Article closely examines the growing body of posthumous endorsement law and sets forth a new framework that better respects
both the agency of the deceased as well as the continuing bonds
between the deceased, their fans, and their families. Intellectual
property (IP) scholars have critiqued other forms of postmortem IP,
such as copyright and publicity rights, but this Article shows that
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Antognini, Beth Colgan, Kristelia Garcia, James Grimmelmann, Taylor Hurwitz, Thea
Johnson, Irina Manta, Kaipo Matsumura, Tejas Narechania, Alexandra Roberts, Jeremy
Sheff, Matthew Sipe, Eva Subotnik, Reid Weisbord, and participants at the Georgetown Law
Faculty Workshop, University of Virginia Law Faculty Workshop, George Washington
University IP Speaker Series, 2020 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, and 2020 IP
MOSAIC Conference.
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posthumous endorsement rights pose unique and largely unaddressed concerns.
First, these rights frequently pose a continuity problem: courts
have allowed endorsement rights to shift from the decedent, to their
heirs, to unrelated third parties without acknowledging just how
differently situated each of these entities is with respect to the
communicated endorsement. Second, these rights pose discursive
problems: they allow rightsholders to speak in the “official” voice of
the decedent, leveraging the individual’s continuing cultural influence into commercial and political endeavors that emerge long after
their death. Third, these rights pose dignitary concerns: individuals
are often symbolically brought back from the dead without their
consent and forced to speak on behalf of entities that have purchased
their goodwill on the open market.
Nonetheless, there are some important reasons for IP laws to
recognize at least some form of posthumous endorsement rights.
Marketing scholarship has shown that posthumous endorsements
are often material to consumers, and there is a shared interest
among the decedent, their fans, and their families in shutting
down false suggestions that a good or service received the decedent’s blessing. Accordingly, this Article proposes that courts only
recognize posthumous endorsement rights where there is both “privity and power.” An entity can only meaningfully endorse goods or
services on behalf of a decedent—or affirmatively disclaim their
approval—when they (1) own the image, word, or symbol that is
signaling endorsement and (2) are empowered to make legal decisions on the decedent’s behalf. Only when an individual is
empowered to step into the shoes of a decedent, and required to act
in the decedent’s best interests, can the individual fairly and
accurately speak for the dead.
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INTRODUCTION
The dead were extremely vocal in 2020. In January, fresh off her
first gold-certified single in twenty years, Whitney Houston promoted an international hologram tour,1 which was sadly cut short
by the COVID-19 pandemic.2 Throughout the pandemic, Houston3
and other deceased celebrities such as Tupac Shakur,4 Bob Marley,5
Bob Ross,6 and Jimi Hendrix7 actively promoted branded face masks
through their official, checkmark-verified Instagram pages.8 As
Black Lives Matter protests arose throughout the United States, the
official Instagram accounts of Amy Winehouse, Marilyn Monroe,
Muhammad Ali, Elvis Presley, The Notorious B.I.G., and John
Lennon participated in #BlackoutTuesday, posting black squares
meant to publicly signal solidarity with the movement.9 And as the
1. Whitney Houston (@whitneyhouston), INSTAGRAM (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.insta
gram.com/p/B7oG59NDveF/ [https://perma.cc/HD5Q-MQCZ].
2. See Daniel S. Levine, Whitney Houston Hologram Las Vegas Show Slammed by Fans
as “Morally Wrong,” POPCULTURE (July 22, 2021, 11:49 PM), https://popculture.com/music/
news/whitney-houston-hologram-las-vegas-show-slammed-fans-morally-wrong/#:~:text=
The%20show%20was%20originally%20supposed,in%20February% 20and%20March%202020
[https://perma.cc/D24G-K5P5].
3. Whitney Houston (@whitneyhouston), INSTAGRAM (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.insta
gram.com/p/CEb4FEvoRcz/ [https://perma.cc/QV7P-ZDVU] (“The light purple Whitney masks
are selling fast! Don’t wait—click the link in bio to get yours today!”).
4. Tupac Shakur (@2pac), INSTAGRAM (May 12, 2020), https://www.instagram.com/p/
CAGG3GNg0fZ/ [https://perma.cc/4KUY-EYX8] (“New face coverings available now.”).
5. Bob Marley (@bobmarley), INSTAGRAM (May 21, 2020), https:// www.instagram.com/
p/CAdjGaTp70S/ [https://perma.cc/34M9-7J6D] (“We’ve got you covered!”).
6. Bob Ross (@bobross_thejoyofpainting), INSTAGRAM (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.insta
gram.com/p/CD38YMBgOIg/ [https://perma.cc/YJ9V-N8K3] (“Let’s put a happy little mask ...
there.”).
7. Jimi Hendrix (@jimihendrix), INSTAGRAM (May 16, 2020), https://www.instagram.
com/p/CAQWjUVlNKz/ [https://perma.cc/9UFR-Q3W8] (“Stay safe. Look good staying safe.”).
8. A checkmark on an Instagram account indicates that “Instagram has confirmed that
an account is the authentic presence of the public figure, celebrity or global brand it represents.” See Altynai Alamanova, How to Get Verified on Instagram?, SOCIALITY.IO, https://social
ity.io/blog/how-to-get-verified-on-instagram/#:~:text=It%20means%20Instagram%20has%20
confirmed,or%20global%20brand%20it%20represents.%E2%80%9D [https://perma.cc/3B9SVXZQ]. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text for examples of the verified deceased celebrity accounts selling COVID-19 face masks through such accounts.
9. E.g., Muhammad Ali (@muhammadali), INSTAGRAM (June 2, 2020), https://
www.instagram.com/p/CA77o6sp1KL/ [https://perma.cc/6FQB-HY2X]; Marilyn Monroe
(@marilynmonroe), INSTAGRAM (June 2, 2020), https://www.instagram.com/p/CA77kVmgF6t/
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presidential election approached, disputes ignited around whether
deceased individuals such as Ronald Reagan and Tom Petty would
have supported the Trump Campaign.10 Throughout all the major
upheavals of 2020, endorsements by the deceased proved to be commercially, culturally, and politically valuable.
Intellectual property (IP) scholars have largely assumed that any
exclusive sponsorship or endorsement rights granted to a person
during their life must logically expire upon their death. For example, Professor Mark Lemley recently observed, “it is hard to argue with a straight face that a dead person is endorsing a product.”11
This widely shared intuition reflects an understandable logic: dead
people cannot affirmatively put their stamp of approval on a
product, service, or cause that postdates them. Ordinarily when we
think of an individual endorsing a product, it involves some voluntary act of association or approval,12 but this definition is hard to
square with endorsements that occur long after that person has
died.
Trademark and unfair competition laws, however, increasingly
diverge from these scholarly intuitions and instead reflect the growing commercial and cultural practices of posthumous endorsement.
Even if an individual has died, those who inherit their trademark
[https://perma.cc/Q6HB-XET4]; Amy Winehouse (@amywinehouse), INSTAGRAM (June 4, 2020),
https://www.instagram.com/p/CBA55r5Jd4i/ [https://perma.cc/7ZS3-WYHB]; Elvis Presley
(@elvis), INSTAGRAM (June 2, 2020), https://www.instagram.com/p/CA77hyYjQmB/ [https://
perma.cc/UA47-X2KB]; The Notorious B.I.G. (@thenotoriousbig), INSTAGRAM (June 2, 2020),
https://www.instagram.com/p/CA7M2MZhDAp/ [https://perma.cc/U57W-HJSJ]; John Lennon
(@johnlennon), INSTAGRAM (June 2, 2020), https://instagram.com/p/CA7aUN4JL34/ [https://
perma.cc/2GX6-G282].
10. See Karen Tumulty, Reagan Foundation to Trump, RNC: Quit Raising Money off
Ronald Reagan’s Legacy, WASH. POST (July 25, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2020/07/25/reaganfoundation-trump-rnc-quit-raising-money-off-ronaldreaganslegacy/ [https://perma.cc/LD9J-2W9J]; Tom Petty (@tompetty), TWITTER (June 20,
2020, 10:22 PM), https://twitter.com/tompetty/status/ 1274527971513004033 [https://perma.cc/
YJX3-AP2B] (“Tom Petty would never want a song of his used for a campaign of hate. He liked
to bring people together.”).
11. Mark A. Lemley, Privacy, Property, and Publicity, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1153, 1173
(2019).
12. See, e.g., William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social
Marketing, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1127 (“The baseline of a true endorsement should be
defined as an accurate and voluntary declaration of support.” (emphasis omitted)); see also
FTC Guide Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R.
§ 255.1 (2020) (“Endorsements must reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser.”).
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rights retain the exclusive rights to control indications of endorsement by the deceased and to enter into lucrative endorsement deals
in their name.13 Numerous courts have allowed federal Lanham Act
claims in which there is a likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship
or endorsement by the decedent, their estates, or their successors in
interest.14 These three entities are often materially different from
each other, but trademark law collapses them together in service of
a thriving industry of posthumous endorsement.15
This Article evaluates the growing body of posthumous endorsement law and shows numerous ways in which this area of law risks
misleading consumers, distorting discourse, and degrading the legacy of the deceased. First, posthumous endorsement law presents a
continuity problem.16 Lanham Act case law often overlooks the
significance of property transfers from the decedent to their direct
heirs to unrelated third parties and obscures just how differently
situated each of these entities may be with respect to the decedent’s
surviving fans, family, and friends.
For example, the Estate of Marilyn Monroe, LLC—a successful
posthumous endorsement litigant17—is owned and operated by
13. See, e.g., David Rowell, The Spectacular, Strange Rise of Music Holograms, WASH.
POST MAG. (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/magazine/2019/10/30/deadmusicians-are-taking-stage-again-hologram-form-is-this-kind-encore-we-really-want/
[https://perma.cc/6NBE-ZUL8]; Ed Christman, Primary Wave Acquires Share of Bob Marley’s
Music Catalog, BILLBOARD (Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/8094231/
primary-wave-acquires-share-bob-marley-publishing-catalog-blackrock-blue-mountain-music
[https://perma.cc/SQ6A-CKC4] (describing $50 million deal); The Estate of Michael Jackson
and ABG Partner to Expand the Michael Jackson™ Brand Worldwide, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr.
29, 2015), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-estate-of-michael-jackson-and-abgpartner-to-expand-the-michael-jackson-brand-worldwide-300074050.html [https://perma.cc/
AWZ7-AFCZ].
14. See, e.g., A.V.E.L.A., Inc. v. Est. of Marilyn Monroe, LLC, 364 F. Supp. 3d 291, 304
(S.D.N.Y. 2019); Est. of Barré v. Carter, 272 F. Supp. 3d 906, 913 (E.D. La. 2017); Experience
Hendrix, LLC v. Tiger Paw Distribs., LLC, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d 1004, 1013 (S.D. Ga. 2016), order
amended by No. CV 416-107, 2016 WL 3963079 (S.D. Ga. July 21, 2016); Fifty-Six Hope Rd.
Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 778 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2015); Erickson Beamon Ltd. v.
CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 5105, 2014 WL 3950897, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2014);
Branca v. Mann, 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1993, 1999 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc.,
542 F.3d 1007, 1011 (3d Cir. 2008); Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Elec. Hendrix, LLC, 90
U.S.P.Q.2d 1883, 1889-90 (W.D. Wash. 2008); Ferrer v. Maychick, 69 F. Supp. 2d 495, 502
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
15. See, e.g., A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 364 F. Supp. 3d at 301-02.
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 364 F. Supp. 3d at 327.
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individuals with no personal connection to Monroe.18 Accordingly,
her current rightsholders have little insight into what she would
have thought about mask-wearing during a pandemic, Black Lives
Matter, or the highly gendered commercial endeavors that she
continues to be associated with.19 When Marilyn Monroe’s name officially appears on goods and services today, there is nothing to
indicate to consumers who precisely is pulling the strings of posthumous endorsement or who benefits from the products she is urging customers to buy.20 Trademark law typically prohibits transfers
of a mark in gross—in other words, without the goodwill associated
with the original owner21—but in the posthumous endorsement
context, courts repeatedly lump together the decedent, heirs, and
assignees where there is suggestion of endorsement by an undefined
and nebulously labeled “estate.”22
Second, posthumous endorsement laws present a variety of discursive problems—that is, they give rightsholders substantial control over the decedent’s legacy and public meaning.23 Posthumous
assertions of trademark law allow a successor in interest to control
the “official” statements of the decedent about a particular topic,
and such official messaging has a tendency to produce a whitewashed, oversimplified, and maximally marketable portrait of the
decedent. For example, in promoting the Whitney Houston hologram tour, the marketing company that purchased 50 percent of her
estate emphasized that “Whitney was America’s sweetheart, and the
18. See The Entrepreneur Keeping Marilyn Monroe Alive, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/video/5855494792001/#4e4115e451aa [https://perma.cc/92ES-C7UH].
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 18:3 (5th ed. 2021) (“If one obtains a trademark through an assignment in gross, divorced
from the good will of the assignor, the assignee obtains the symbol, but not the reality. Any
subsequent use of the mark by the assignee may be in connection with a different business,
a different good will and a different type of product. The continuity of the thing symbolized
by the mark is broken.”).
22. See, e.g., Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 778 F.3d 1059, 1073 (9th
Cir. 2015) (“[T]his court already treats a celebrity’s persona as identifiable intellectual
property protectable under the Lanham Act. This property exists whether the holder is the
celebrity or a successor in interest. Thus, the fact of the celebrity’s death does not preclude
a § 1125(a) claim.” (citation omitted)); Branca v. Mann, 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1993, 1998-99 (C.D.
Cal. 2012) (“Nor is it relevant to this analysis that Jackson is deceased and that his estate is
therefore asserting his rights.”).
23. See infra Part III.B.
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idea now is to remind people that that is what her legacy is.”24 Fans
of Houston are certainly aware of alternative, less-than-sweet legacies associated with the singer.25
Moreover, where a decedent has a devoted base of political supporters, such as Ronald Reagan or Martin Luther King, Jr., whoever
obtains that person’s endorsement rights can hold a lot of leverage
in political discourse moving forward.26 Reagan’s and King’s legacies
are both highly prized and highly contested, but trademark law
allows family members and affluent assignees to weigh in on such
legacies in their official voices.27 In other areas of IP, in particular
copyright and publicity rights, scholars have been critical of postmortem rights for allowing successors in interest to squelch
celebrations, critical discussions, and academic research about a
decedent.28 Much less attention has been given to inherited trademark rights, which, unlike time-limited copyright and trademark
rights, give rightsholders potentially perpetual control over the
decedent’s cultural voice.29
Third, posthumous endorsement rights present significant dignitary concerns. Through inherited endorsement rights, rightsholders
can culturally resurrect a decedent with ongoing commercial value
and give them a voice in connection with activities that they might
have had little interest in supporting.30 Legal scholars in other
contexts have increasingly recognized that the dead retain autonomy, dignitary, and reputational interests after they pass.31 These
24. Ben Sisario, Whitney Houston’s Estate Plans a Hologram Tour and a New Album, N.Y.
TIMES (May 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/20/business/media/whitney-houstonhologram-album.html [https://perma.cc/QVL4-W2WF].
25. See, e.g., New Documentary Explores Whitney Houston’s Sexuality, Drug Use, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 22, 2017, 8:17 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/documentary-exploreswhitney-houstons-sexuality-drug/story?id=49343037 [https://perma.cc/MH45-ZKEN].
26. See Tumulty, supra note 10; Mike Masnick, Tarnishing The History of Martin Luther
King Jr.: Copyright Enforcement Edition, TECHDIRT (Feb. 5, 2018, 3:38 PM), https://www.tech
dirt.com/articles/20180205/14355439159/tarnishing-history-martin-luther-king-jr-copyrightenforcement-edition.shtml [https://perma.cc/X2YR-Y6CD].
27. See, e.g., Masnick, supra note 26; Tumulty, supra note 10. Reagan and King’s names
and distinctive phrases are subject to numerous registered trademarks. See, e.g., RONALD
REAGAN, Registration No. 5,167,497; I HAVE A DREAM, Registration No. 75,019,950.
28. See generally Andrew Gilden, IP, R.I.P., 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 639 (2017) (summarizing
critiques).
29. See infra Part III.C.
30. See, e.g., FORBES, supra note 18.
31. See, e.g., Fred O. Smith, Jr., The Constitution After Death, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1471,
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interests appear to be highly salient in certain forms of posthumous
endorsement, in which rightsholders hold out the decedent as affirmatively supporting a product or cause.
In the #BlackoutTuesday context, deceased celebrities are being
conscripted into a highly polarized political debate in a way they
might have objected to, based upon the rightsholder’s perception
that their participation would increase the value of their brand.32 In
the COVID-19 face mask context, the deceased celebrity’s name is
being used to commercialize public health needs in a manner that
potentially exploits both the decedent and the vulnerabilities of
their fans. For example, in response to an Instagram post promoting Bob Ross face masks, one user commented, “[t]his seems very
non Bob Ross. Profiteering during a pandemic using a deadman’s
[sic] likeness.”33 Posthumous endorsements risk reanimating and
giving voice to the deceased, without their consent, in contexts that
they may have objected to.
Although there are serious problems with posthumous endorsement rights, there are at least two compelling reasons not to completely abolish this growing body of law.34 First, advertising and
marketing scholarship has demonstrated that posthumous endorsements can be material to consumers. A substantial body of scholarship has shown that through consuming endorsed products, fans of
the decedent can process their grief, maintain a sense of connection
with the deceased, reconnect with cherished memories of their
youth, and support the decedent’s charitable causes and surviving
family members.35
Second, posthumous endorsement rights in certain contexts can
prevent exploitation of the deceased. Although posthumous endorsements do often reanimate the deceased without their consent, posthumous endorsement rights have been asserted in order
to stop third parties from capitalizing on the commercial value of
1491 (2020); DON HERZOG, DEFAMING THE DEAD 103-05 (2017).
32. For example, in response to Elvis Presley’s June 2 post, one of his Instagram followers
commented, “[t]his should be deleted. Elvis kept his politics to himself but he loved our police
officers and our country. He would not have supported the defund the police/destroy America
movement.” Elvis Presley, supra note 9 (comment by user @ryanmoore).
33. Bob Ross, supra note 6 (comment by user @cooperbcarr).
34. See infra Part III.D.
35. See, e.g., Gilden, supra note 28, at 691-92.
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decedents. False endorsement claims have been brought on behalf
of decedents of color who were the victims of various forms of
lifetime discrimination and who continue to be exploited postmortem without attribution or compensation.36
This Article accordingly proposes a new framework for recognizing the potential value of posthumous endorsement rights while
reining in their excesses. Rather than recognize endorsement rights
in whatever entity inherits or purchases the decedent’s trademarks
and/or persona rights, courts should only recognize endorsement
rights where there is both “privity” and “power.”37 A putative rightsholder should be required to show not just that they are the
successor in interest to the name, image, or symbol being used to
signal endorsement (that is, the privity requirement), but also that
they are legally empowered to make binding decisions on behalf of
the deceased, for example as the decedent’s personal representative
or trustee.38 Most of the dangers of posthumous endorsements occur when there is no formal estate plan and no ongoing fiduciary
obligation to the decedent. A “privity and power” framework would
both strongly nudge the living to plan for posthumous decisionmaking and impose obligations on transferees to consider the
ongoing interests of the decedent alongside their own financial
interests.
An endorsement is a voluntary exercise of an individual’s agency,
and such exercise can only meaningfully occur after a person’s death
when there is someone authorized to stand in their shoes and make
decisions on their behalf. By ensuring that rightsholders are acting
in some form of fiduciary capacity, the transition from the decedent
36. See, e.g., Brooks ex rel. Est. of Bell v. Topps Co., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1361, 1362-63 (S.D.N.Y.
2007); Est. of Barré v. Carter, 272 F. Supp. 3d 906, 911-12 (E.D. La. 2017); see also Josh Peter,
Cashing in on George Floyd: T-Shirts, Pillows, Running Shoes and Even Underwear Are Being
Sold, Some of It Through Amazon, USA TODAY (June 26, 2020, 11:55 AM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/06/15/george-floyd-death-protests-lead-merchandisesales-amazon/5337489002/ [https://perma.cc/HAQ2-XLFZ]; Lori Jane Gliha, “Elijah McClain”
Trademarked in Colorado, FOX 31 KDVR (July 17, 2020, 12:16 PM), https://kdvr.com/
news/local/elijah-mcclain-trademarked-in-colorado/ [https://perma.cc/6LY3-PM6L].
37. See infra Part IV.B.
38. Analogous decision-making frameworks exist in the contexts of attorney-client and
doctor-patient privileges, HIPAA, and the Stored Communications Act. See Ajemian v. Yahoo!,
Inc., 84 N.E.3d 766, 776 (Mass. 2017) (“[P]ersonal representatives provide consent lawfully
on a decedent’s behalf in a variety of circumstances under both Federal and common law.”).
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to their successors is less likely to represent a qualitative break
from the decedent’s prerogative and more likely to represent a
meaningful transfer of the decedent’s goodwill. Posthumous endorsement law in its current form places far too much emphasis on
ownership of the decedent’s name or image and far too little emphasis on the stewardship necessary to meaningfully respect both
the dignity of the deceased as well as the vulnerability of living
individuals who retain strong attachments to them.
The case law surrounding posthumous endorsements focuses on
endorsements by celebrities and other public figures, but the
challenges of posthumous agency and stewardship revealed in these
cases apply much more broadly. Due to the pervasive use of social
media accounts that typically outlive their creators, nearly everyone
today will at some point experience a “social afterlife” that is controlled by the individuals that survive them.39 And emerging technologies, such as personalized holograms and Artificial Intelligence
(AI)-driven chatbots, increasingly allow everyday individuals to
reanimate the dead and put them to whatever sentimental or economic use they choose.40 It is therefore becoming increasingly important for scholars to conceptualize the ongoing cultural role of the
deceased and for the legal system to put in place mechanisms for
responsible stewardship of the social afterlife. The law and practices
of posthumous endorsement highlight these emerging challenges.
Part I introduces the commercial practices of posthumous endorsement. Drawing from existing scholarship on endorsement,
largely from advertising and marketing literature, it summarizes
the appeal of posthumous endorsements for both brands and consumers, as well as the potential perils of posthumous endorsements
gone wrong. Part II provides an overview of posthumous endorsement law. It juxtaposes IP scholars’ dismissal of posthumous endorsement with a growing body of case law that expressly embraces
39. See Andrew Gilden, The Social Afterlife, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 329, 346 (2020).
40. See, e.g., Tamara Kneese, Death, Disrupted, 8.1-2 CONTINENT 70, 70-71 (2019);
Timothy Geigner, Microsoft Patent: Chatbots Made from the Online Habits of Dead People,
TECHDIRT (Jan. 29, 2021, 7:39 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210128/09252046141/
microsoft-patent-chatbots-made-online-habits-dead-people.shtml [https://perma.cc/NTD2YHJY]; Kayne West Gives Kim Kardashian Birthday Hologram of Dead Father, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-54731382 [https://perma.cc/
4VN4-4MN5].
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posthumous endorsement claims. These cases involve (1) Lanham
Act claims based on the unauthorized use of personal name trademarks, such as JIMI HENDRIX,41 that have been transferred via
will, trust, or intestacy; (2) Lanham Act claims based upon the use
of a decedent’s persona to confusingly suggest that the decedent or
their estate sponsored or endorsed the defendant’s goods or services;
and (3) proceedings to cancel trademark registrations in the name
of entities who are not the decedent’s heirs. Part III sets forth the
Article’s main criticisms about the current state of posthumous
endorsement law—namely, the potential for continuity, discursive,
and dignitary problems. It then sets forth countervailing reasons for
maintaining at least a narrow version of posthumous endorsement
rights. Part IV proposes a “privity and power” framework for
posthumous endorsement rights. It limits exclusive endorsement
rights to those entities that are empowered to stand in the shoes of
the decedent and bound to act in their best interests.
I. THE PRACTICES OF POSTHUMOUS ENDORSEMENT
Although the dead have played a role in commercial, cultural, and
political enterprises for centuries, technological advances over the
past thirty years have resulted in a substantial increase in the
prominence of deceased celebrities in mass marketing and popular
culture. These technological resurrection strategies have taken
several forms. For example, improvements in video and photo
editing software have enabled the repurposing of archived footage
of deceased celebrities to meet contemporary commercial needs:
footage of Steve McQueen driving a classic Mustang was edited to
make him appear in a commercial for the (less-than-classic) Ford
Puma;42 footage of Fred Astaire dancing with Ginger Rogers was
edited to make him appear to dance with a Dirt Devil vacuum

41. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
42. See Ben Hodges, When Steve McQueen Made the Ford Puma “The King of Cool,”
DRIVETRIBE (2017), https://drivetribe.com/p/when-steve-mcqueen-made-the-ford-XRURwVbP
SumBez8s5SoPtA?iid=JfBAXyiZRkymcXMntk9qpQ [https://perma.cc/458H-NKXJ].
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cleaner;43 and John Wayne’s face was digitally superimposed on a
body double for a Coors advertisement.44
In the early 2000s, advanced text-to-speech software was developed to inventory recordings of a person’s speech and rearrange
those recorded sounds in order to “put words in someone else’s
mouth” and “allow the dead to speak.”45 Such text-to-speech software, combined with advances in CGI “morphing” technologies, enabled the creation of entirely new footage of deceased celebrities.46
Perhaps the most prominent example is actor Peter Cushing, who
died in 1994, reprising his role of Grand Moff Tarkin in the 2016
film Star Wars: Rogue One.47 Using similar technology, Bruce Lee
has appeared in Johnnie Walker whiskey advertisements,48 and
James Dean has been recently cast in the movie Finding Jack.49
Such recreations need not be entirely two-dimensional; deceased
artists including Tupac Shakur, Michael Jackson, and Whitney
Houston have all performed live via digital hologram technologies.50
Social media has provided another substantial vehicle for the
dead to continue influencing commercial and cultural activity
43. See Skip Wollenberg, Fred Astaire Dances with Vacuums in Commercials Set for Super
Bowl Debut, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 8, 1997), https://apnews.com/article/253758edc00908fc9f
65d30cd7e6c4b2 [https://perma.cc/V4GZ-QTNW].
44. See Kara Kovalchik, 8 Dead Celebrities Brought Back to Life to Sell Stuff, MENTAL
FLOSS (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/20659/dead-celebrities-broughtback-sell-stuff [https://perma.cc/X7MM-84G8].
45. Denver D’Rozario & Frank K. Bryant, The Use of Dead Celebrity Images in Advertising
and Marketing—Review, Ethical Recommendations and Cautions for Practitioners, 5 INT’L J.
MKTG. STUD. 1, 4 (2013).
46. See id. at 3-4.
47. See Andrew Pulver, Rogue One VFX Head: “We Didn’t Do Anything Peter Cushing
Would’ve Objected to,” THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2017, 9:13 AM), https://www.theguardian.
com/film/2017/jan/16/rogue-one-vfx-jon-knoll-peter-cushing-ethics-of-digital-resurrections
[https://perma.cc/27NX-WE47].
48. See John Reynolds, Bruce Lee Resurrected for Johnnie Walker Whisky Ad, THE
GUARDIAN (July 10, 2013, 9:26 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/jul/10/brucelee-johnnie-walker-whisky-ad [https://perma.cc/2LLR-WPF3].
49. See Alex Ritman, James Dean Reborn in CGI for Vietnam War Action-Drama,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Nov. 6, 2019, 6:10 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movienews/afm-james-dean-reborn-cgi-vietnam-war-action-drama-1252703/ [https://perma.cc/YE6ATYH6].
50. See, e.g., Lulu Garcia-Navarro & Jason King, “An Evening with Whitney” Hologram
Tour Trades on the Image of a Complicated Star, NPR (Feb. 23, 2020, 7:19 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/02/23/808322471/an-evening-with-whitney-hologram-tour-trades-onthe-image-of-a-complicated-star [https://perma.cc/G6KF-5YLW].
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postmortem. Just as living celebrities like Madonna and Kim
Kardashian regularly post on Twitter or Instagram about everything from their children to politics to beauty products,51 the social
media accounts of a wide range of celebrities remain active long
after they have passed. Amy Winehouse’s Instagram account posts
messages in support of Black Lives Matter and showcases artwork
created by devoted fans.52 Muhammad Ali’s Instagram account
similarly posts ongoing support for Black Lives Matter53 and promotes commercial goods like Gatorade sports drinks.54 Bettie Page’s
Instagram account promotes the sale of a wide range of merchandise, including lingerie and pandemic-era cloth face masks,55 and
Marilyn Monroe promotes everything from Snickers bars, to Zales
jewelry, to gemstones, to teeth-whitening solutions, interspersed
with holiday wishes, old photos, and, once again, support for Black
Lives Matter.56 Many of these deceased celebrity social media
accounts are accompanied by prized blue check marks, indicating
that these are authentic, verified accounts of the individual or brand
they represent.57
Accompanying the growing presence of deceased celebrity
endorsers has been the emergence of a new industry of deceased
celebrity agents, managers, and public relations specialists.58
51. See Madonna (@madonna), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/madonna/ [https://
perma.cc/T4JK-EAWK]; Kim Kardashian West (@KimKardashian), TWITTER, https://twitter.
com/KimKardashian?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
[https://perma.cc/GY8J-8CQF].
52. See Amy Winehouse (@amywinehouse), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/amy
winehouse/ [https://perma.cc/Z69M-SDRV].
53. See Muhammad Ali (@muhammadali), INSTAGRAM (June 11, 2020), https://www.insta
gram.com/p/CBTI-NYjxDx/ [https://perma.cc/545L-J2VR].
54. See Muhammad Ali (@muhammadali), INSTAGRAM (June 2, 2021), https://www.insta
gram.com/p/CPooSVYA7ut/ [https://perma.cc/2T8X-F3UU].
55. See Bettie Page (@bettiepage), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/bettiepage/
[https://perma.cc/9RSZ-JYN9].
56. See Marilyn Monroe (@marilynmonroe), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/mari
lynmonroe/ [https://perma.cc/X5UU-W263].
57. See Instagram Help Ctr., Verified Badges, FACEBOOK (2021), https://www.facebook.
com/help/instagram/854227311295302 [https://perma.cc/4CB5-2XDX]; see also Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Trademark Infringement by Impersonation of Markholders, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 851, 864 (2010).
58. See Steve Kroft, How Celebs Make a Living After Death, CBS NEWS (Sept. 25, 2009,
6:57 PM), https:// www.cbsnews.com/news/how-celebs-make-a-living-after-death-25-09-2009/
[https://perma.cc/PHH4-JWQH].
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Licensing agents have worked with the families of deceased
celebrities since the 1980s to navigate commercialization opportunities, such as authorizing tribute bands, releasing archived
recordings, and licensing merchandise with the decedent’s image.59
Although the clients working with licensing agents are technically
the decedents’ families or other assignees of the decedent’s trademark, copyright, and/or publicity rights, the commercial relationships presented to the public are framed as being between the
agents and the deceased celebrities themselves. For example, the
website of CMG Worldwide states that the R&B artist Aaliyah, who
died in a plane crash in 2001, has been a “[c]lient since 2014.”60
In addition to entities like CMG, which work on behalf of celebrities and their estates,61 the past decade has seen a noticeable shift
in the industry towards licensing companies outright purchasing the
IP rights of deceased celebrities and accordingly gaining control over
their “official” posthumous lives. The Authentic Brands Group has
purchased the rights to Marilyn Monroe, Muhammad Ali, and Elvis
Presley,62 and licensing entity Primary Wave Music has purchased
James Brown’s estate,63 a controlling stake in Whitney Houston’s
estate,64 and a substantial stake in Prince’s estate.65 With an increased financial stake and legal control over deceased celebrities,
entities like Authentic Brands Group have entered into partnerships with “digital human technology” companies, like the Facebank
Group, in order “to identify opportunities to license Facebank’s
59. See Jake Halpern, An Agent for Dead Celebrities, NPR (Aug. 29, 2005, 12:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4822573 [https://perma.cc/BS7LRGGA].
60. Aaliyah, CMG WORLDWIDE, https://www.cmgworldwide.com/aaliyah/ [https://perma.
cc/3PQ4-3PVM].
61. See id.
62. Paul Bond, Elvis Presley’s Rights Sold to Authentic Brands Group, HOLLYWOOD REP.
(Nov. 19, 2013, 3:47 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/general-news/elvispresleys-rights-sold-authentic-657924/ [https://perma.cc/5HJE-N3M6].
63. Cathy Applefeld Olson, James Brown’s Estate Sold to Primary Wave Music in Deal
Estimated at $90 Million, FORBES (Dec. 13, 2021, 12:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
cathyolson/2021/12/13/james-browns-estate-sold-to-primary-wave-music-in-deal-estimated-at90-million/ [https://perma.cc/8NY2-VL4Z].
64. See Sisario, supra note 24.
65. See Ethan Millman, Primary Wave Partners with Prince Estate!, PRIMARY WAVE
MUSIC (Aug. 2, 2021), https://primarywave.com/primary-wave-partners-with-prince-estate/
[https://perma.cc/PUP4-V25S].
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photo and hyper-realistic, computer-generated technology to third
parties and bring ABG’s iconic intellectual properties to life.”66
The explosion in commercial activities surrounding deceased
celebrities suggests quite strongly that posthumous endorsements
are perceived as being both persuasive and worthy of substantial
financial investment. For purposes of evaluating the growing body
of law that has emerged to support these posthumous endorsement
practices, it is important to gauge why posthumous endorsement
might be effective at motivating consumer activity. In addition to
the small, but growing, body of advertising and marketing literature addressing posthumous endorsement, there is a larger body of
scholarship that is useful in explaining why endorsements by celebrities—living or dead—can be so effective.
A. Theories of Celebrity Endorsements
The term “celebrity endorsements” has been defined in a few
different ways within advertising and marketing scholarship. The
most common definition posits the celebrity endorser as “any individual who enjoys public recognition and who uses this recognition
on behalf of a consumer good by appearing with it in an advertisement.”67 Other scholars view this definition as too narrow in that it
both fails to account for endorsement activities in the political and
nonprofit sectors and underemphasizes the contractual negotiation
between celebrity and endorsee that precedes the endorsement.68
Accordingly, a more recent definition of celebrity endorsement is “an
agreement between an individual who enjoys public recognition (a
celebrity) and an entity (e.g., a brand) to use the celebrity for the
purpose of promoting the entity.”69

66. Facebank Announces Strategic Partnership with Authentic Brands Group, INTRADOGLOBE NEWSWIRE (Feb. 11, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/
2020/02/11/1982990/0/en/Facebook-Announces-Strategic-Partnership-with-Authentic-BrandsGroup.html [https://perma.cc/ZVB4-BKUT].
67. Lars Bergkvist & Kris Qiang Zhou, Celebrity Endorsements: A Literature Review and
Research Agenda, 35 INT’L J. ADVERT. 642, 643 (2016) (quoting Grant McCracken, Who Is the
Celebrity Endorser? Cultural Foundations of the Endorsement Process, 14 J. CONSUMER RSCH.
310, 310 (1989)).
68. See id. at 643-44.
69. Id. at 644.
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Consumer endorsements have repeatedly been shown to be
effective in motivating sales of consumer goods and in increasing
consumer engagements with the endorsed brand. There are two
schools of thought, however, on the mechanisms through which
endorsements become effective.
Under “source models” of endorsement, a celebrity’s messages to
consumers are persuasive based largely on the positive characteristics associated with the celebrity.70 Credibility and authenticity are
the most salient characteristics.71 If a celebrity is generally seen as
being trustworthy and as having some basis for evaluating a
particular good or service—for example, expertise in a domain or
real-world usage—then the celebrity’s decision to associate themselves with that product signals to consumers that the endorsed
good or service is worth consuming.72 For example, Michael Jordan
is a credible endorser for athletic footwear, and Kylie Jenner is a
credible endorser for a skincare line that visibly improved her complexion.73 Another variant on the source model of endorsement
emphasizes the likability and physical attractiveness of an endorser;
if a consumer is attracted to a celebrity, for example Jennifer
Aniston, they are more likely to purchase a product she is endorsing, for example Aveeno soap and lotions.74
The source models, conversely, predict that endorsements are
likely to fail where there is a mismatch between celebrity and
endorsee or where a well-publicized scandal makes the celebrity
appear less honest or attractive.75 When there is no obvious reason
to connect the celebrity with a particular product—for example,

70. See B. Zafer Erdogan, Celebrity Endorsement: A Literature Review, 15 J. MKTG. MGMT.
291, 297-302 (1999).
71. See id. at 297-98.
72. See id.
73. The FTC’s guidelines draw a distinction between an “endorsement,” in which an
individual acts as a (typically paid) spokesperson for a particular brand, and a “testimonial,”
in which an individual shares their own personal experience using a product. See The FTC’s
Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 27, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/ftcs-endorsement-guides-whatpeople-are-asking [https://perma.cc/GG3M-3WGH]. Neither the scholarship on the psychology
of effective celebrity marketing nor the false endorsement case law appear to draw a sharp
distinction between these two scenarios.
74. See Erdogan, supra note 70, at 299, 301-02.
75. See id. at 302-04.
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Ozzy Osbourne and I Can’t Believe It’s Not Butter76—the source
model literature hypothesizes that the celebrity will be viewed as
bought off, and their endorsement will not motivate purchasing
behavior or consumer engagement.77 Similarly, the value of a celebrity endorsement may decrease substantially when they have
engaged in some behavior seen as dishonest or unappealing.78
Accordingly, following revelations of Tiger Woods’ extramarital
affairs, numerous brands distanced themselves from their former
endorser.79
The second major conceptual model of celebrity endorsement is
the “Meaning Transfer Model” developed by cultural anthropologist
Grant McCracken.80 This model sees the celebrity endorser as representing a constellation of cultural meanings distilled from their
professional exploits (for example, songs they have sung or characters they have played) and their personal activities (for example,
charitable giving or adopting children).81 The goal of the endorsement process, in this model, is to include the endorsed brand in this
constellation of meaning, thereby symbolically transferring qualities
associated with the celebrity onto the product.82 When consumers
purchase the endorsed product, the Meaning Transfer Model views
this act as an attempt by consumers to transfer those qualities onto
themselves, thereby constituting both consumption and a form of
self-definition.83 For example, when consumers purchase Air Jordans, they want to “Be Like Mike,” at least symbolically.84 The
Meaning Transfer Model emphasizes that the power of celebrity
endorsements stems not just through credible, authentic pushing
76. See Weston Gardner, Celebrity Endorsements Are the Worst. Why Do So Many
Companies Use Them?, BETTER COPY (Aug. 13, 2015), https://bettercopy.org/2015/08/13/
celebrity-endorsements-are-the-worst-why-do-so-many-companies-use-them/
[https://perma.cc/5ZH3-SRK8].
77. See Erdogan, supra note 70, at 303.
78. See id. at 299.
79. See Chris Hackley & Rungpaka Amy Hackley, Marketing and the Cultural Production
of Celebrity in the Era of Media Convergence, 31 J. MKTG. MGMT. 461, 472 (2015).
80. See generally McCracken, supra note 67, at 312.
81. See id. at 313-14.
82. See id. at 316.
83. See id. at 317.
84. See Gavin Evans, ‘Be Like Mike’: The Story Behind Michael Jordan’s Iconic Gatorade
Commercial Song, COMPLEX (May 6, 2016), https://www.complex.com/sports/2016/05/be-likemike-michael-jordan-gatorade-commercial-song [https://perma.cc/M7J3-NQS8].
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of a product in front of consumers, but also by building up a broad
range of positive associations with the celebrity.85 This means that
charitable or political work is not peripheral to the commercial value of a celebrity identity; it is deeply connected.
The Meaning Transfer Model highlights a range of pitfalls for
celebrity endorsements. The constellation of cultural meaning of a
celebrity is often highly dynamic and contested, and may mean different things to different people. For example, when Donald Trump
appears to publicly endorse Goya food products,86 the Goya brand
may absorb a wide range of cultural meanings depending upon the
political persuasion of particular consumers. In the eyes of Trump’s
detractors, his endorsement may not just be ineffective at motivating purchases, as the source models might conclude, but it may
contaminate the Goya brand with negative characteristics often
associated with him.87 Or when J.K. Rowling makes public statements hostile to transgender people, public perceptions of transphobia can contaminate the book, movie, and merchandise franchises
associated with her.88
Moreover, recent examinations of the Meaning Transfer Model
have shown that transference is bi-directional. The cultural meanings associated with the endorsed product, or even of the consumers of the endorsed product, can transfer “back” onto the celebrity.89
For example, celebrity chef Jamie Oliver was a prominent endorser
of the British grocery store company Sainsbury’s.90 Although he was
85. See McCracken, supra note 67, at 313.
86. Marc Caputo, Struggling with Latinos, Trump Hypes Goya Food Fight, POLITICO (July
15, 2020, 7:27 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/15/trump-latino-support-goya2020-364856 [https://perma.cc/N3HF-NUFY].
87. See McCracken, supra note 67, at 316.
88. See Emma Pocock, U.S. Harry Potter Book Sales Underperforming, According to
Recent Industry Figures, FORBES (July 19, 2020, 2:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
emmapocock/2020/07/19/us-harry-potter-book-sales-underperforming-according-to-recentindustry-figures/?sh=409ef549464b [https://perma.cc/PRQ7-WEWS].
89. Elina Halonen-Knight & Leila Hurmerinta, Who Endorses Whom? Meanings Transfer
in Celebrity Endorsement, 19 J. PROD. & BRAND MGMT. 452, 459 (2010). Legal scholar
Professor David Tan has examined the Meaning Transfer Model in the context of the right of
publicity, emphasizing that the celebrity’s fame, and the associative economic value that
accompanies it, is constructed by the celebrity individual, their consuming fans, and the
corporate intermediaries that develop and market the celebrity’s image. See David Tan,
Beyond Trademark Law: What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Cultural Studies, 25
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 913, 916 (2008).
90. See Simon Bowers, Jamie Oliver’s Partnership with Sainsbury’s Ends, THE GUARDIAN
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brought on board to signal both refinement and sustainability, the
company’s environmentally questionable supply chain altered public perceptions of both Oliver personally—he was described as a
“culinary whore” who had been “selling his soul”—as well as his
restaurants and other business pursuits.91
B. The Risks and Rewards of Posthumous Endorsements
After considering the dominant theoretical approaches to celebrity endorsements, the appeal, and potential perils, of deploying
endorsements by deceased celebrities becomes more apparent.
Under the source models of endorsement, deceased celebrities are
in a position to be highly persuasive.92 Deceased celebrities like
Marilyn Monroe, John Wayne, or Whitney Houston were highly
cherished figures during many consumers’ youth, and nostalgia for
these bygone days has been shown to be an especially powerful
motivator of consumer activity—particularly for the Baby Boomer
generation.93 If a childhood crush or celebrity idol appears to stand
behind a product, then that association will resonate strongly for
many consumers.
This persuasiveness may seem strange, given the widespread
knowledge of that person’s death, but scholars have shown that
consumers often engage in a suspension of disbelief and rather enjoy embracing the fiction of imagining the celebrity still alive.94
Because a celebrity’s fans rarely actually knew the human being
(July 12, 2011, 1:33 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/jul/12/jamie-oliversainsburys [https://perma.cc/TSQ5-NSM2].
91. Halonen-Knight & Hurmerinta, supra note 89, at 456.
92. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
93. See D’Rozario & Bryant, supra note 45, at 1 (“Many of these ageing baby-boomers
drive the demand for Deleb imagery through their continuing emotional connection to the
celebrity as fans, even long after the celebrity has passed away.”); Subhadip Roy & Jyoti
Sharma, Dead or Living: Which Celebrity to Endorse?, 13 GREAT LAKES HERALD 1, 6 (2019)
(“As for expertise and attractiveness, theory of nostalgia suggests that dead celebrities are
often glorified after their deaths by their fans resulting in enhanced regard for their abilities
and charm.” (citation omitted)).
94. See Denver D’Rozario, Dead Celebrity (Deleb) Use in Marketing: An Initial Theoretical
Exposition, 33 PSYCH. & MKTG. 486, 493 (2016) (examining how dead celebrity marketing
triggers the “[p]leasure of [i]magination”); see also Sean Hannon Williams, Gossip and Gore:
A Ghoulish Journey into a Philosophical Thicket, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1187, 1198 (2018) (“[W]e
have trouble turning off our powerful connections to others.”).
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when they were alive, but instead only knew them as mediated
through agents, publicists, and popular culture depictions, the
transfer to death of the human being does not necessarily change
the day-to-day experience of fandom once the initial shock of death
has subsided.95 As a result of the highly mediated nature of celebrity, if the endorser was credible, authentic, and attractive while
they were alive, then those persuasive traits can effectively carry
over into the commercial afterlife.96 Social media campaigns facilitate both the suspension of disbelief and the mediated nature of
celebrity endorsements by creating the appearance of an interactive
relationship between the verified, authentic celebrity and their
many followers.97
Death may in some circumstances make a celebrity more persuasive than they were during life. Numerous studies have shown
that the death of a celebrity, even one plagued by scandal, substantially increases demand for items associated with them.98 When a
celebrity dies, there is a cultural tendency to sacralize them by
focusing on their positive impact on the world they left behind and
to downplay messier attributes that might undermine the persuasiveness of living celebrities.99 Amy Winehouse, Whitney Houston,
and Michael Jackson have become highly valuable commercial entities in their digital afterlives, even though their substance use and
chaotic personal lives made them less-than-ideal spokespeople
towards the end of their lives.100 Moreover, due to the perceived sacredness of spaces and items associated with the deceased celebrity,
consumers are primed to consume goods and services that are

95. Cf. Joli Jensen, Introduction—On Fandom, Celebrity, and Mediation: Posthumous
Possibilities, in AFTERLIFE AS AFTERIMAGE: UNDERSTANDING POSTHUMOUS FAME xvii, xix
(Steve Jones & Joli Jensen eds., 2005).
96. See Alexandra Sherlock, Larger than Life: Digital Resurrection and the ReEnchantment of Society, 29 INFO. SOC’Y 164, 168 (2013).
97. See Benjamin Boeuf & Jessica Darveau, Posting from Beyond the Grave: An Autopsy
of Consumer Attitudes Toward Promotional Communication in a Posthumous Context, 34
INT’L J. RSCH. MKTG. 892, 898 (2017).
98. See, e.g., Ruth Penfold-Mounce, Value, Bodily Capital, and Gender Inequality After
Death, 25 SOC. RSCH. ONLINE 490, 496-97 (2020); Steve Jones, Better Off Dead: Or, Making
It the Hard Way, in AFTERLIFE AS AFTERIMAGE, supra note 95, at 3-4.
99. See Scott K. Radford & Peter H. Bloch, Grief, Commiseration, and Consumption
Following the Death of a Celebrity, 12 J. CONSUMER CULTURE 137, 140 (2012).
100. See Penfold-Mounce, supra note 98, at 496-97; supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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perceived as supporting the decedent’s families or causes associated
with the decedent.101 In short, sacredness is highly persuasive.
There are also some practical advantages for brands in employing
a deceased spokesperson. Deceased endorsers are far less likely to
have new scandals emerge that would undermine their credibility
or attractiveness.102 Although new information can of course be unearthed about a decedent, they are not going to have a new affair or
express new controversial political opinions. Moreover, many prized
deceased endorsers, like Marilyn Monroe or Bruce Lee, will never
grow old or gain weight, and as a result their physical attractiveness
will remain crystallized in the minds of consumers. And finally, a
dead person is much, much cheaper to hire than a living person
and makes far fewer demands.103
The source models also signal some potential dangers of posthumous endorsements. Although the sacred status of a dead celebrity can prime certain consumption behavior, consumers respond
quite negatively to commercial messages that appear largely profitmotivated.104 When consumers sense that a posthumous promotion
is exploitative rather than commemorative, they are not likely to be
persuaded to support the promoted good, service, or cause.105 This
suggests that those who control the messages emanating from the
decedent’s estate and/or their official media pages need to be careful
about the timing of commercial promotions, their choice of brand
partnerships, and overusing the goodwill associated with the
decedent.

101. See Radford & Bloch, supra note 99, at 140-41.
102. See D’Rozario, supra note 94, at 489 tbl.1.
103. See D’Rozario & Bryant, supra note 45, at 1-2; D’Rozario, supra note 94, at 489 tbl.1.
104. Benjamin Boeuf & Jessica Darveau, Don’t Disturb the Dead: Consumers’ Attitude
Toward Promotional Messages on Post-Mortem Facebook Pages, 8 ADVANCES ADVERT. RSCH.
71, 77 (2017).
105. See Radford & Bloch, supra note 99, at 150 (observing consumer disdain toward profiteering following the death of Dale Earnhardt, but embrace of officially licensed merchandise
coming from Earnhardt’s family and other Earnhardt-related sources); RUTH PENFOLDMOUNCE, DEATH, THE DEAD AND POPULAR CULTURE 31-32 (2018) (describing criticism of the
James Dean and Fred Astaire estates for perceived profiteering); Benjamin Boeuf & Jessica
Darveau, An Ethical Perspective on Necro-Advertising: The Moderating Effect of Brand Equity,
155 J. BUS. ETHICS 1077, 1080 (2019) (“By explicitly mentioning that the brand concluded an
agreement with the deleb’s estate, the brand reassures consumers that the use of the image
is not illegal or unconsented.”).
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Under the Meaning Transfer Model, posthumous endorsements
are effective because dead celebrities often have positive cultural
associations that fans want to incorporate into themselves, and this
hunger for the decedent’s cultural meaning can be amplified by
feelings of grief and nostalgia.106 For example, consumers may want
to associate themselves with Marilyn Monroe’s glamorous sex
appeal or with James Dean’s rebellious masculinity, and consumption of goods associated with these individuals might symbolically
bring the consumer closer to these idealized forms of 1950s/60s
gender and sexuality. According to Professor Denver D’Rozario,
“[t]oday’s superheroes are too sensitive for some, who long for the
alpha-male heroes of yesteryear.”107
Moreover, the death of a celebrity does induce a real, though often stigmatized, form of mourning in their fans, and consumption
of endorsed or “official” goods can be a way of maintaining a continuing bond with them.108 Through posthumous endorsements, accordingly, today’s consumers can maintain an association with a
particular decedent as well as with a nostalgized set of cultural
values present in their youth. Posthumous endorsements might be
said to “Make Advertising Great Again”;109 by symbolically associating with the stars of the past, consumers can keep the past alive.
The Meaning Transfer Model does, however, suggest that the
cultural meaning of a long-deceased celebrity remains dynamic.110
Although, as discussed above, many consumers are drawn to a lost,
cherished past, this same past is potentially viewed unsavorily by
many others.111 If those representing posthumous endorsers wish to
update the constellation of meanings associated with them to reflect
changing social mores, the Meaning Transfer Model indicates that
new meanings are possible.112 If a deceased celebrity can somehow
produce new work product, for example by releasing archived music

106. See McCracken, supra note 67, at 313.
107. D’Rozario, supra note 94, at 491 tbl.2.
108. See Gilden, supra note 28, at 641.
109. See Emma Margolin, “Make America Great Again”—Who Said It First?, NBC NEWS
(Sept. 9, 2016, 2:17 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/make-america-greatagain-who-said-it-first-n645716 [https://perma.cc/RE2G-5KKU].
110. See McCracken, supra note 67, at 312.
111. See Boeuf & Darveau, supra note 97, at 898.
112. See McCracken, supra note 67, at 315.
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or starring in new films via CGI technologies, these new releases
can help shift the decedent’s present-day cultural associations.113
Moreover, by associating with contemporary charitable or political
causes, such as climate change or racial justice, a star of the 1950s
can appear to be in touch with the views of younger consumers
today.114
The drawbacks of posthumous endorsements under the Meaning
Transfer Model mirror the drawbacks with living endorsements.
Miscalculated brand alliances can contaminate the endorser, and
consumers of the endorsed brands can transfer negative cultural
associations back onto the deceased celebrity.115 New digital technologies and social media can help moderate these effects to some
degree, but the absence of the living individual does make it harder
for agents to actively steer this meaning-making process.
In sum, endorsers—dead or alive—are effective when seen as
appealing and credible, or when they maintain a set of positive
cultural associations. But there are numerous obstacles to successful posthumous endorsement. With every effort to capitalize on the
sacred status of the deceased comes a serious risk that the managers of the deceased will be seen as exploiting their memory. And as
much as brands, endorsers, and their agents may try to tightly
control the messages communicated to consumers, the cultural
meaning of the endorser and their messaging is always dependent
to a large extent on the diverse perspectives of consumers.
C. Legal Scholarship on Celebrity Endorsement
Legal scholars have written relatively little about the rights of
individuals to control indicia of endorsement, let alone the rights to
control such indicia posthumously. Although there is a significant
body of scholarship that has examined the postmortem right of publicity, which (in many states) allows a person’s heirs and devisees to
control the use of a person’s likeness in commercial or advertising
uses,116 publicity rights do not require consumers to believe that the
113.
114.
115.
116.

See id.
See id.
See supra Part I.A.
See Joshua C. Tate, Immortal Fame: Publicity Rights, Taxation, and the Power of
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decedent or the estate affirmatively stands behind the good or service in question.117 The rights to control commercial use of a deceased person’s image are broad enough to cover perceptions of
both involuntary and voluntary associations between that individual and a good or service, but little scholarship has examined
the unique concerns around the voluntary associations built into
the concept of endorsement.
Legal scholars who have directly considered questions of endorsement have emphasized concerns that map onto the source models
and Meaning Transfer Model dominant in advertising and marketing literature. Professor William McGeveran has emphasized that
endorsements in the social media context are useful so long as they
are voluntary and accurate.118 Consumers want to know that the
endorser has indeed had some firsthand exposure to the endorsed
good or service and that they are in fact choosing to stand behind
it.119 Without these hallmarks of voluntariness and accuracy, false
endorsements can corrode the quality of information made available to consumers.120 Given that official endorsements are material
to many consumers, corroded information surrounding endorsements has the potential to mislead consumers into purchasing
products they would otherwise avoid.121
Professors Laura Heymann, Mark Lemley, and Mark McKenna
have also expressed concerns about false endorsements relating
back to the endorser. They note that in addition to deceiving consumers, false endorsements have the effect of usurping other
Testation, 44 GA. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2009) (surveying literature supporting and opposing a
postmortem right of publicity); JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY
REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 6-7, 123-26 (2018) (same).
117. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from
Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1195 (2006).
118. See McGeveran, supra note 12, at 1127.
119. See id. at 1127-28.
120. See id. at 1127.
121. See id. at 1128; see also Alexandra J. Roberts, False Influencing, 109 GEO. L.J. 81, 84
(2020) (noting that because of trust placed in social media influencers, social media followers
may be materially deceived when influencers endorse products they never actually used);
Matthew B. Kugler, The Materiality of Sponsorship Confusion, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1911,
1947 (2017) (empirically showing materiality of officially licensed merchandise to a large
subset of consumers); Laura R. Bradford, Trademark Law and Agency Costs, 55 IDEA 193,
201 (2015) (“A wealth of empirical literature suggests that consumers find clear sponsorship
and affiliation information useful in making purchasing decisions.”).
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people’s voices, painting an incorrect portrait of the values they
hold, and undermining their ability to define themselves publicly.122
Given this repeated concern for voluntariness in the endorsement
process, a few scholars have accordingly expressed skepticism that
there should be a legal right to control posthumous endorsements,
which, due to the nature of death, do not involve voluntary decisionmaking by the endorser.123
II. THE LAW OF POSTHUMOUS ENDORSEMENT
Notwithstanding the skepticism by some scholars towards the
need to control posthumous endorsements, trademark and unfair
competition case law increasingly gives deceased celebrities’ heirs,
devisees, and other successors in interest the ability to prevent
others from falsely suggesting that the deceased celebrity posthumously endorsed a particular good or service.124 Trademark and
unfair competition laws generally protect against the commercial
use of a symbol, or other commercial statements, that are likely to
cause confusion about the origin of a particular good or service.125
Although historically the relevant consumer confusion involved
perceptions about who produced a particular good or service, contemporary trademark and unfair competition law proscribes confusion about who sponsored, approved, or endorsed that good or
service.126
Accordingly, trademark and unfair competition laws have developed several doctrines that facilitate the posthumous endorsement
122. See Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52
B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1421 (2011); Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous
Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 281-82 (2005); Lemley, supra note 11, at 1172 (“Both
private and public figures should be entitled to decide whether and when to endorse products. Deceiving the public about whether someone has done so hurts both that person and
the public.”).
123. See Lemley, supra note 11, at 1173 (“[I]t is hard to argue with a straight face that a
dead person is endorsing a product.”); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 117, at 1196 n.161 (“We
can imagine only limited circumstances in which a confusion-based right of publicity might
survive death, such as use of digital technology to make it seem that an actor appeared in a
movie in which he did not.”).
124. See Barton Beebe, What Trademark Law Is Learning from the Right of Publicity, 42
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 389, 393-96 (2019).
125. See id. at 393.
126. See id. at 393-94.
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industries examined in the previous Part. This Part will examine
three areas of trademark law127 that have come to constitute the
laws of posthumous endorsement: (1) false endorsement claims under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act; (2) trademark infringement
claims in which the registered mark is the name or image of a
deceased individual; and (3) cancellations and opposition proceedings by celebrity estates against individuals who try to register as
a trademark the name or image of the decedent.
Despite the intuitive strangeness of dead people endorsing goods
and services postmortem, trademark law conceptually maps quite
well onto the theories of posthumous endorsement outlined in the
previous Part. The primary motivations for trademark law are to
protect consumers from deception and to reduce the costs of finding
desired goods and services.128 Whenever consumers see a particular
name or symbol—for example, ARMANI—in connection with a
product, they are informed that this product is produced, sponsored,
or endorsed by the same entity that produced, sponsored, or endorsed other products bearing the same name or symbol.129 If a
consumer has a satisfying experience with ARMANI business suits
or fragrances, the ARMANI mark can signal to that consumer that
they can expect a similar experience with ARMANI shoes, scarves,
or gowns.130 Or if ARMANI shoes disintegrate after a single use, the

127. This Part does not focus on the postmortem right of publicity provided in many states,
except where it expressly intersects with other doctrines. Postmortem publicity rights
generally allow a rightsholder to prevent the unauthorized use of the decedent’s name, image,
or likeness for trade or advertising purposes. See ROTHMAN, supra note 116, at 3, 5-7. As a
practical matter, a celebrity’s estate and other successors in interest can assert publicity
rights when a third party falsely suggests that a decedent endorsed their good or service,
because such a suggestion will almost always involve displaying the decedent’s name or
image. See Gilden, supra note 28, at 641-42. Nevertheless, this Article brackets the right of
publicity for three reasons. First, there are important conceptual differences between using
someone’s image without their consent and suggesting that they are voluntarily placing their
stamp of approval on a product through endorsement. Second, most states do not have
postmortem publicity rights, and those that do place some temporal limitation on the right.
See id. at 647. Rights created by trademark and unfair competition law, by contrast, are
potentially perpetual. See id. at 646-7. Third, a substantial body of scholarship has analyzed
postmortem publicity rights. See, e.g., id. at 642. But little scholarship has discussed the case
law below.
128. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995).
129. See id. at 162-64.
130. See id.
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consumer knows whom to hold accountable.131 By giving a single
entity control over the ARMANI mark in the fashion market, that
entity can build credibility and accountability with consumers over
time.132 This consumer goodwill justification corresponds quite well
to the source models of posthumous endorsement.133 If consumers
found Giorgio Armani to be a credible authority on fashion during
his life, the continued use of Armani’s name postmortem signals a
continuity in credible endorsements, notwithstanding the death of
the designer-endorser himself.
Trademark law’s bolstering of consumer goodwill also contains
an important semiotic dimension. Brand names like ARMANI or
DISNEY or WALMART or PORSCHE signal much more than just
a relationship of production or licensing between a commercial
entity and a particular good or service. These names also signify a
complex bundle of cultural meanings, and consumers purchase
branded goods and services at least in part for the values embedded in—and communicated by—a particular brand.134 Trademark
law, though subject to important free speech limitations,135 can help
maintain the stability of meanings associated with a mark by preventing third parties from associating it with vastly different and/or
inferior offerings.136 This semiotic justification maps quite neatly
onto the Meaning Transfer Model of posthumous endorsements.137
Celebrity endorsers are associated with a set of cultural values that
fans wish to emulate through consumption, and meaning transfer
can still take place even if the signifier of such values is deceased.138
As the following Sections show, despite its potential promise to
instantiate the theory and practices of posthumous endorsement,
trademark law largely has not lived up to such promise. It has failed
to ensure meaningful continuity in the goodwill associated with a
particular deceased celebrity and moreover has allowed third
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See supra Part I.A.
134. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621,
646 (2004).
135. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU
L. REV. 381, 383-86 (2008).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (prohibiting dilution by blurring and tarnishment).
137. See supra Part I.A.
138. See McCracken, supra note 67, at 312-14.
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parties with thin connections to the decedent to both co-opt and
fossilize the cultural meaning associated with them. More fundamentally, the law of posthumous endorsement largely fails to
grapple with how an individual’s death might impact the extension
of trademark laws into the postmortem context. The following three
Sections set forth the pertinent details of posthumous endorsement
law before turning to a fuller critique in Part III.
A. Lanham Act Section 43(a) False Endorsement Claims
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits the use in commerce of
any “name, symbol, or device ... which ... is likely to cause confusion
... as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of ... goods, services, or
commercial activities.”139 It is widely accepted that a celebrity’s
“persona” is a protectable “symbol” under section 43(a) and that the
statute’s reference to “sponsorship or approval” can encompass a
claim for false suggestions of a celebrity endorsement.140 As stated
by the Sixth Circuit, “courts routinely recognize a property right
in celebrity identity akin to that of a trademark holder under
§ 43(a).”141 Accordingly, numerous living public figures, including
Woody Allen,142 Vanna White,143 Tom Waits,144 Jesse Jackson,145 and

139. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
140. See, e.g., Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 778 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th
Cir. 2015) (“[A] celebrity whose endorsement of a product is implied through the imitation of
a distinctive attribute of the celebrity’s identity, has standing to sue for false endorsement
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.” (quoting Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110
(9th Cir. 1992))); Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1014 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing
Waits, 978 F.2d at 1106-07) (“The NFL does not deny that courts broadly interpret the terms
‘name, symbol, or device’ in § 43(a)(1) to include other indicia of identity, such as a person’s
voice.... [n]or ... that Facenda’s voice is distinctive and generally protectable as an unregistered mark.”). See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 28:15.
141. Parks v. LaFace Recs., 329 F.3d 437, 447 (6th Cir. 2003).
142. Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 617, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (video retailer
used Woody Allen look-alike Phil Boroff in an advertising photograph).
143. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992) (Samsung used
robot facsimile of Vanna White in an electronics ad).
144. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1096 (advertisement for Doritos chips used a soundalike performer
of Tom Waits).
145. Jackson v. MPI Home Video, 694 F. Supp. 483, 483-87 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (unauthorized
sale of a videotape of presidential candidate Jesse Jackson’s speech at the 1988 Democratic
National Convention with packaging suggesting that he approved of the sale).
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50 Cent146 have brought successful claims in which uses of their
image—or close approximations of their image—have falsely suggested that they sponsored or approved of the defendant’s offerings.
Because a celebrity’s persona is treated as a trademark-like
property interest under the Lanham Act, this property interest is
increasingly recognized as alienable and descendible.147 Accordingly,
those who inherit a deceased celebrity’s persona or otherwise
acquire persona rights from the deceased celebrity’s heirs or devisees can stand in the celebrity’s shoes and assert false endorsement
claims against posthumous users of the decedent’s persona. Most
commonly, posthumous endorsement claims have been asserted
by the executors of the decedent’s estate or by the decedent’s surviving family members.148 For example, in Branca v. Mann, the
executors of Michael Jackson’s estate successfully brought a false
endorsement claim against individuals who had launched websites
such as “michaeljacksonsecretvault.com” and “MJgives.com” shortly
after Jackson’s death.149
Other surviving family members have asserted false endorsement
claims far longer after the celebrity’s death. For example, in Bruce
Lee Enterprises, LLC v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., the court observed that
actor Bruce Lee died intestate in 1973 and that the rights to his
name, image, and likeness passed to his wife, Linda, and his two
children, Brandon and Shannon.150 Those rights eventually transferred to Shannon’s wholly owned LLC, named Bruce Lee Enterprises, which was allowed to assert a false endorsement claim
almost forty years after Lee’s death against a company that sold tshirts and other merchandise featuring Lee’s image.151
146. Jackson v. Odenat, 9 F. Supp. 3d 342, 348-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (photographs of 50 Cent
displayed on hip hop website).
147. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 117, at 1166.
148. See, e.g., Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 778 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th
Cir. 2015) (“Plaintiff Hope Road is an entity owned by Marley’s children, formed for the
purpose of acquiring and exploiting assets, rights, and commercial interests in the late Bob
Marley.”); Est. of Barré v. Carter, 272 F. Supp. 3d 906, 911 (E.D. La. 2017) (denying motion
to dismiss false endorsement claim brought by sister and personal representative of deceased
rapper Messy Mya, whose voice was featured in the Beyoncé song “Formation”).
149. No. CV 11-00584 DDP, 2011 WL 13218028, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2011).
150. No. 10-CV-2333, 2013 WL 822173, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013).
151. Id. at *3, *19. As demonstrated throughout this Section, much of the recent posthumous endorsement litigation features the company A.V.E.L.A., which specializes in producing and licensing merchandise featuring famous pop culture images, including the images
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In order to assert a posthumous false endorsement claim, an entity need not, however, be a surviving family member or a personal
representative.152 Most notably, in A.V.E.L.A., Inc. v. Estate of
Marilyn Monroe, LLC, the court allowed a false endorsement claim
by an entity that had complete ownership over Marilyn Monroe’s intellectual property but zero personal connection to the late actress.153 Marilyn Monroe died in 1962, and her will devised 75
percent of the residue of her estate (which included her intellectual
property rights) to her acting teacher, Lee Strasberg, which then
passed to Strasberg’s wife upon his death in 1982.154 The remaining
25 percent went to Marianna Kris, Monroe’s psychiatrist, who
passed her portion to the Anna Freud Center when she died in
1980.155 Strasberg became the administrator of the Monroe estate
from 1989 until 2001, when the estate finally closed.156 At that
point, the estate transferred all its assets to a newly formed company, Marilyn Monroe, LLC, which was owned by Ms. Strasberg
and the Freud Center until 2010.157
In 2010, the Authentic Brands Group purchased a controlling
interest (and later the entire interest) in Marilyn Monroe, LLC, and
established a new subsidiary, the Estate of Marilyn Monroe, LLC,
to manage the assets it had acquired.158 The defendants in the
Estate of Marilyn Monroe litigation argued that “the Estate ha[d] no
connection to the actual person of Marilyn Monroe” and that the
plaintiff “[was] not Monroe’s family, heir, estate, or assignee.”159 The
court rejected this argument in light of the “unbroken chain of title
[that] extend[ed] from the decedent to the Estate.”160 Pointing to the
Bruce Lee Enterprises decision, the court noted that the plaintiff in
that case “was not Bruce Lee’s nuclear family, but a corporation
of famous deceased celebrities. See id. at *3.
152. See id. at *3.
153. 364 F. Supp. 3d 291, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
154. Id. at 308.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id.; see also Marilyn Monroe’s Estate—Learn from Her Mistakes, KAHN L. FIRM
(Apr. 30, 2018), http://www.thekahnlawfirm.net/advice-answers-advocacy/marilyn-monroesestate-learn-from-her-mistakes [https://perma.cc/9GQ8-9XYW].
159. 364 F. Supp. 3d at 302, 307.
160. Id. at 308.
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formed by his heirs, that was permitted to pursue the claims. The
Court s[aw] no reason why, if that corporation had been purchased
by others, the claims would disappear.”161
Although the section 43(a) case law now seems to allow a posthumous endorsement claim by anyone with an unbroken chain of
title to a deceased celebrity,162 there are at least two oddities with
this pure chain-of-title approach. First, it is not clear which intellectual property interest the plaintiff needs title to in order to assert a false endorsement claim.163 Most of the 43(a) litigation refers
to a property right in a plaintiff’s “persona,”164 which is a concept
typically covered by state law rights of publicity; indeed, the right
of publicity chain of title is the focus of several cases.165 At the same
time, there is no postmortem right of publicity in many states,
including, until recently,166 New York, meaning that posthumous
endorsement claims based upon a New York domiciliary’s publicity
rights have been founded upon a chain of title that had extinguished.167 Nonetheless, courts have allowed posthumous endorsement
claims for New York domiciliaries such as Marilyn Monroe.168 Other
decisions seem to focus on the chain of title of the decedent’s
trademark rights,169 which is understandable given the Lanham Act
cause of action, while others have based false endorsement claims
161. Id. at 309 (citation omitted).
162. See, e.g., id.
163. Professor Jennifer Rothman has recently described the confusing overlap between
rights of publicity and personal trademarks as the “identity thicket.” Jennifer Rothman,
Navigating the Identity Thicket: Trademark’s Lost Theory of Personality, the Right of Publicity, and Preemption, 135 HARV. L. REV. 1271 (2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3949826 [https://perma.cc/72YU-P6YR].
164. See, e.g., Est. of Barré v. Carter, 272 F. Supp. 3d 906, 941 & n.308 (E.D. La. 2017).
165. See, e.g., Est. of Marilyn Monroe, 364 F. Supp. 3d at 308.
166. James P. Flynn, Le Morte d’Elvis: The Birth of New Claims as New York Statute
Recognizes Post Mortem Right of Publicity, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.natlaw
review.com/article/le-morte-d-elvis-birth-new-claims-new-york-statute-recognizes-postmortem-right [https://perma.cc/KD8H-Y6WH].
167. In Avalos v. IAC/Interactivecorp., the court denied a false endorsement claim by the
transferee of the decedent’s Nebraska publicity rights, which are inalienable. No. 13-CV-8351,
2014 WL 5493242, at *1-4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2014). Nonetheless, the Estate of Marilyn Monroe
court refused to read that decision as holding that “the false endorsement claim requires a
right of publicity.” 364 F. Supp. 3d at 308.
168. See Est. of Marilyn Monroe, 364 F. Supp. 3d at 309.
169. See Est. of Barré, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 941 (“[C]ourts have consistently recognized false
endorsement claims brought by the estate of deceased celebrities who have sufficiently alleged
ownership of the celebrity’s persona and marks.”).
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upon a combination of intellectual property rights.170 It is therefore
unclear whether the false endorsement claim follows the chain of
title of any particular intellectual property right or is instead sui
generis.
Second, to the extent that a false endorsement claim is a type of
descendible trademark right, the posthumous endorsement cases
strangely disregard a core principle of trademark law: the assignment-in-gross rule.171 Trademark rights are triggered by the use in
commerce of a symbol in conjunction with a particular set of goods
and services in such a way that consumers come to associate that
symbol with a consistent source.172 Because trademarks signal the
source of goods and help the trademark owner build goodwill with
consumers, trademarks cannot be transferred to third parties “in
gross”—that is, without the accompanying transfer of the physical
or human capital in which consumer goodwill has come to reside.173
If trademarks are transferred without any accompanying goodwill,
they may no longer serve the source and quality signaling functions
that benefit consumers.174 Although the assignment in gross doctrine has at times extinguished certain transfers of personal name
trademarks,175 this doctrine has never been invoked when false endorsement rights have transferred from a decedent to their estate
to their heirs to third-party assignees.176 Part IV of this Article will
examine in greater depth why the failure to invoke the assignmentin-gross doctrine is particularly problematic in this context, but for
now it is important to simply note the doctrine’s glaring absence.

170. See Erickson Beamon Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 5105, 2014 WL
3950897, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2014) (“As an initial matter, defendants maintain that they
own all intellectual property affiliated with Bette Davis; based on this averment, it is plausible that defendants own the exclusive right to use the ‘Bette Davis’ name in commerce.”).
171. See MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 18:3.
172. See supra Part II.A.
173. See Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A trademark
is merely a symbol of goodwill and has no independent significance apart from the goodwill
that it symbolizes. Therefore, a trademark cannot be sold or assigned apart from the goodwill
it symbolizes.” (citations omitted)).
174. See id. (“Use of the mark by the assignee in connection with a different goodwill and
different product would result in a fraud on the purchasing public who reasonably assume
that the mark signifies the same thing.”).
175. See MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 18.35.
176. See infra Part IV.A.
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Even assuming that a successor in interest to something has
standing to assert a false endorsement claim, the case law signals
further uncertainties as to what precisely triggers liability under
section 43(a). First, false endorsement claims generally need to
show that an appreciable number of consumers would likely be
confused as to whether the celebrity individual endorsed the
product, but in the postmortem context, courts expand the focus to
the potential perception of endorsement by the celebrity or their
estates or their successors in interest.177 These entities, although
linked through some chain of title, are very different from the
consumers’ perspective; nonetheless, courts conflate them within
the likelihood of confusion analysis.178
Although successors in interest are entitled to bring false endorsement claims, some courts have held that the decedent needed
to have exploited endorsement rights to some degree during their
lifetime in order for the court to find that consumers would likely be
confused about a posthumous endorsement. For example, the successors to Princess Diana’s intellectual property rights were unable
to show a likelihood of consumer confusion postmortem because
unauthorized commercial uses of her image were ubiquitous during
her life.179 Accordingly, posthumous use of her image would not

177. See A.V.E.L.A., Inc. v. Est. of Marilyn Monroe, LLC, 364 F. Supp. 3d 291, 309
(S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he Estate Parties must demonstrate that a reasonable jury would always
find that AVELA’s products mislead or confuse consumers into believing that Ms. Monroe or
her Estate endorsed the products. To prevail on their cross-motion, the AVELA Parties must
demonstrate that no reasonable jury could find that consumers believe Ms. Monroe, or the
holders of the rights to Ms. Monroe’s persona, endorsed the product.” (emphasis added)
(citation omitted)); Bruce Lee Enters., LLC v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., No. 10-CV-2333, 2013 WL
822173, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013) (“Plaintiffs have not established that consumers would
believe Bruce Lee or his estate endorsed AVELA’s products.” (emphasis added)); Fifty-Six
Hope Rd. Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 778 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2015) (accepting survey
that asked whether merchandise received permission from “Bob Marley/the person on the
shirt or his heirs, estate, or agents”).
178. See Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music, 778 F.3d at 1070.
179. See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Between
1981 and 1997, many products, including some that were largely indistinguishable from
Franklin Mint products, bore the name and likeness of Princess Diana .... Consumers,
therefore, had no reason to believe Franklin Mint’s Diana-related products were endorsed by
the Princess. This did not change when, following Princess Diana’s death in 1997, the Fund
endorsed approximately twenty products—but not Franklin Mint’s—amidst a flood of unendorsed Diana-related memorabilia.”).
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signal the existence of an endorsement deal to consumers.180
Conversely, where an individual had not made any commercial use
of their likeness during their lifetime, courts have held that consumers would be unlikely to perceive a compensated endorsement
deal postmortem. For example, in Brooks v. Topps, the court denied
a false endorsement claim against a baseball card manufacturer
that was brought by the daughter of a deceased Negro League
baseball player who had not garnered any significant commercial
sponsorships while he was alive.181
Finally, it is far from clear what types of posthumous activities
are likely to trigger consumer confusion as to endorsement activity—putting the decedent’s image on a t-shirt?182 Launching a
tribute website to the celebrity?183 Sampling the decedent’s music?184
Naming jewelry after the decedent?185 Using the decedent’s voice in
documentary footage?186 To assess a likelihood of confusion, courts
employ a multifactor, fact-intensive inquiry that is difficult to
resolve before trial, and the uncertainty about the outcome of such
an inquiry may justifiably make many potential users of a decedent’s name, image, or likeness hesitant to engage in any activity
that might conceivably be perceived as a posthumous endorsement.187 Given the explosion in digitized commercial, political, and
social media activities officially authorized by a celebrity’s estate,
the right to control posthumous endorsement increasingly creates,
as a practical matter, a perpetual right to control conspicuous commercial uses of a decedent’s persona.

180. See id.
181. Brooks ex rel. Est. of Bell v. Topps Co., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1361, 1367-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
182. See, e.g., Bruce Lee Enters., 2013 WL 822173, at *1.
183. See, e.g., Branca v. Mann, 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1993, 1995 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
184. See, e.g., Est. of Barré v. Carter, 272 F. Supp. 3d 906, 911 (E.D. La. 2017).
185. See, e.g., Erickson Beamon Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 5105, 2014 WL
3950897, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2014).
186. See, e.g., Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1011 (3d Cir. 2008).
187. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law,
116 YALE L.J. 882, 908 (2007); Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in
Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1949 (2007).
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B. Infringement of Inherited Trademarks
A decedent’s successors in interest can also prevent false suggestions of posthumous endorsements when they can show infringement of a trademark comprising the decedent’s name or image.188
Professor William McGeveran has recently set forth a useful
taxonomy of the circumstances in which personal names or images
have been registered as trademarks—what he characterizes as
“selfmarks.”189 First, an individual may have registered their name
or image in the classic scenario in which they are the producer or
provider of a particular set of goods or services—for example, FORD
for cars or CALVIN KLEIN for clothing.190 Second, an individual
may have registered their name or image when they license out
their name or image as the brand for third-party goods or services—for example, TRUMP for steaks, ties, or universities.191
Third, individuals are increasingly registering their names for
“endorsement services”—for example, KIM KARDASHIAN provides
endorsements for goods and services that are branded entirely independently of her.192
The alienability and descendibility of the first category of selfmarks is not particularly remarkable, as consumers are used to
business concerns continuing without their founder. The second,
and especially the third, categories of selfmarks, however, raise
concerns paralleling those associated with section 43(a) posthumous endorsement claims. The value of licensing and endorsement
emerges from the credibility and likability of the decedent,193 yet
trademark law allows trademark rights to become separated from
the deceased individual. For example, in several cases courts have

188. Under section 32 of the Lanham Act, it is unlawful to “use in commerce ... a registered
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods
or services ... which ... is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15
U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
189. See William McGeveran, Selfmarks, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 339 (2018).
190. See id.
191. See id. at 341.
192. See id. at 343-44.
193. See McCracken, supra note 67, at 310-11.
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held that the death of the trademark owner does not strip the mark
of enforceability.194 Accordingly, the estate of Elvis Presley successfully sued the producers of an Elvis impersonation show for infringing its trademark covering entertainment services,195 and the
successors in interest of Jimi Hendrix were able to shut down the
sales of alcoholic beverages featuring Hendrix’s signature.196 Both
courts allowed consumer perceptions of a connection with the decedent to transfer into a connection with the decedent’s successors.197
The primary limitation on using trademarks to control posthumous endorsements is that trademark rights are limited to the
actual uses of particular marks in connection with particular sets of
goods and services.198 Accordingly, if, after the celebrity’s death,
their estate wishes to develop new marks related to the decedent or
establish trademark rights in a new market, the estate must start
the clock anew to establish priority in that market.199 As an
illustration, Elvis Presley established lifetime rights in the trademark ELVIS for “entertainment services.”200 His estate could
continue to exploit this trademark in the entertainment field, for
example by sponsoring official impersonation bands and claiming
priority over other Elvis bands who entered the field after the
singer’s death.201 If, by contrast, his estate wished to enter a new,
unrelated market, such as kitchen appliances, the estate could only
establish rights in ELVIS toasters as of the date it entered the
194. See, e.g., Est. of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1365 (D.N.J. 1981) (“We find
that after Presley’s death, the rights to use the service marks and trademarks identifying the
entertainment services of Elvis Presley and the merchandise licensed by him passed to
Presley’s legal representative as a part of the assets of his estate.... [A]s long as these marks
continue to be used to identify Elvis Presley entertainment services, which are still available
in such forms as records, video tapes, movies, and television performances, the marks will
continue to exist and will not be considered abandoned.” (citations omitted)).
195. Id. at 1370-71 (“The public, realizing that an actual Elvis Presley live stage show is
now impossible, might assume that the plaintiff’s only alternative in order to enter this
specific area of the entertainment field was to produce or sponsor an imitation of a real Elvis
Presley performance.”).
196. See Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Tiger Paw Distribs. LLC, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d 1004, 1013
(S.D. Ga. 2016), order amended by No. CV 416-107, 2016 WL 3963079 (S.D. Ga. July 21,
2016).
197. See id.; Est. of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1371.
198. See McGeveran, supra note 189, at 347.
199. See id.
200. Est. of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1345.
201. See id. at 1371-72.
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toaster market.202 Although this might appear to place estates on a
level playing field with other potential stakeholders in exploiting
new ELVIS markets postmortem, the following Section demonstrates one major advantage held by estates even as to new, previously unexploited markets.
C. Lanham Act Section 2(a) and Marks that Suggest a Connection
to a Dead Person
Although a celebrity’s estate technically needs to compete with
other entities to establish trademark rights in a deceased celebrity’s name (at least where such rights were not established during
the celebrity’s life),203 as a practical matter the estate may be the
only entity entitled to do so. Under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act,
a trademark may not be federally registered if it comprises matter
which may “falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or
dead.”204 The false connection prohibition can be used by the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office to deny a trademark application, or
by third parties seeking to oppose an application or cancel a trademark registration post-issuance.205 The Federal Circuit has observed
that this provision evolved out of, and embraced, the concepts of the
rights of privacy and publicity,206 and the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (TTAB) has interpreted section 2(a) as barring registration when there is “someone (this may be a natural person, estate,
or juristic entity) with rights” in a deceased person’s name.207
Section 2(a) is not technically about the endorsement rights of a
deceased celebrity’s estate, but it does give successors in interest a
substantial leg up over third parties in establishing control over
posthumous endorsements. If an entity can establish that it is the
successor in interest to the decedent’s publicity rights, it is free to
202. See McGeveran, supra note 189, at 347.
203. See Gilden, supra note 28, at 647.
204. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). For a thorough overview of this provision of section 2(a), see Anne
Gilson LaLonde, Giving the Wrong Impression: Section 2(a)’s False Suggestion of a Connection,
110 TRADEMARK REP. 877, 879 (2020).
205. See Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 137576 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
206. See id. at 1376 (“It is a right of this nature, a right to control the use of one’s identity,
which the University also asserts under § 2(a).”).
207. In re MC MC S.r.l., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1378, 1380 (T.T.A.B. 2008).
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register a trademark in the decedent’s name,208 and it has standing
to oppose or cancel equivalent registrations by others.209 For example, in permitting the heirs of Martin Luther King, Jr. to oppose
the registration of WE HAVE A DREAM in connection with sports
and event promotion, the TTAB observed that “the heirs of Dr. King,
by virtue of their status as heirs, have a demonstrable interest in
this proceeding ... the statutory ground of ‘false suggestion of a
connection’ is akin, in part, to the right of publicity, which is an
inheritable right.”210 Moreover, the false connection with “persons,
living or dead” has been interpreted to mean a false connection not
just with a deceased person, but also their heirs and/or their
estate.211
Although doctrinally linking decedents with their heirs might
make sense in light of the (usually) close interpersonal bond between a person and their surviving family members, rights under
section 2(a), like rights under section 43(a), are nonetheless determined by chain of title and not kinship. For example, in the
A.V.E.L.A., Inc. v. Estate of Marilyn Monroe, LLC, litigation, the
defendant attempted to cancel the plaintiff’s MARILYN MONROE
trademarks on the grounds that it was not technically the juridical
entity created in Marilyn Monroe’s probate proceedings.212 Echoing
its chain of title reasoning in the false endorsement context, the
court rejected this argument, noting that “the connection between
the Estate and Monroe is not false or fraudulent.”213 By contrast,
208. See Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Elec. Hendrix, LLC, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 1883, 1889-90
(W.D. Wash. 2008) (observing that Jimi Hendrix’s sister, Janie Hendrix, was able to overcome
a section 2(a) denial to registering the HENDRIX trademark by explaining that her father
was Jimi’s sole heir and transferred his inherited intellectual property to the LLC controlled
by Janie).
209. See Ass’n Pour La Def. et la Promotion De L’oeuvre De Marc Chagall Dite Comite
Marc Chagall v. Bondarchuk, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1838, 1838 (T.T.A.B. 2007).
210. See King v. Trace Publ’g Co., No. 74/475,017, 1999 WL 546877, at *2 (T.T.A.B. July
15, 1999).
211. See In re MC MC S.r.l., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1378 (examining whether mark falsely
suggested a connection to “Maria Callas, the famous, deceased opera singer, her heirs and/or
her estate”); Ass’n Pour La Defense, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1838 (“[R]espondent is not connected
with the painter Marc Chagall or his heirs.”).
212. 364 F. Supp. 3d 291, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
213. See id.; see also In re Jackson Int’l Trading Co., 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1417, 1421 (T.T.A.B.
2012) (denying registration where “CMG Worldwide holds itself out as the exclusive business
representative for the estate of Benny Goodman and the sole entity designated with the legal
authority from his estate to grant permission to use his name”).
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other types of relationships, such as a close friendship with the
decedent, are insufficient; a “financial or ownership interest” and a
“commercial connection” are required instead.214
Finally, notwithstanding the repeated emphasis that section
2(a) mirrors the decedent’s postmortem publicity rights, and that
the chain of title determines rights under section 2(a), courts
nonetheless have rejected or cancelled trademark registrations even
where publicity rights have expired and rights in the decedent’s
image have otherwise entered the public domain.215 Accordingly,
just as in the section 43(a) false endorsement context, trademark
law gives successors in interest to a nebulously articulated property
interest the ability to control commercial exploitations of a decedent’s image long after any publicity rights have expired.216 The
TTAB has suggested that once a decedent becomes a “historical
figure,” they may no longer be subject to section 2(a); it observed
that Ernest Hemingway “who died just under 40 years ago, is a
figure—and celebrity—of our own times,” while Leonardo Da Vinci
is “historical” and thus can be evoked in a registered trademark.217
Nonetheless, the TTAB has given little additional guidance as to
how far into the future the decedent needs to wait until they are no
longer under the control of a particular individual or entity.
III. THE PERILS OF POSTHUMOUS ENDORSEMENT LAW
The growing bodies of trademark and unfair competition law
surveyed in Part II have facilitated the growing industries of posthumous endorsement surveyed in Part I. Nonetheless, there are
numerous problems with these bodies of law. They largely fail to

214. See In re Sloppy Joe’s Int’l, Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1350, 1353-54 (T.T.A.B. 1997)
(“Hemingway’s friendship with the original owner of Sloppy Joe’s bar, his frequenting the bar
and his use of the back room as an office is not the kind of ‘connection’ contemplated by
Section 2(a).”).
215. See id. at 1352 (rejecting applicant’s argument that “because the right of publicity
terminates upon the death of the individual, the Section 2(a) false suggestion of a connection
ground may not be asserted with respect to Ernest Hemingway”).
216. See, e.g., Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Elec. Hendrix, LLC, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 1883, 1889-90
(W.D. Wash. 2008).
217. See id.; In re Sloppy Joe’s, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1354.
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incorporate the insights of advertising and marketing scholarship
about why posthumous endorsements are effective and why consumers are willing to suspend disbelief and act as if their favorite
deceased celebrity continues to promote goods, services, and political
causes. To the extent that trademark law aims to protect consumers
from deception, to help ensure consistency across consumption experiences, and to provide transparent accountability around commercial offerings, posthumous endorsement law largely fails on all
accounts. Additionally, posthumous endorsement law does little to
respect the agency and dignity of deceased endorsers themselves.
This Part first provides three sets of critiques of existing posthumous endorsement law. It then cautiously sets forth some reasons
for nonetheless not scrapping this area of law completely.
A. Continuity Problems
Posthumous endorsement law mistakenly conflates perceptions
of endorsement by the decedent, the decedent’s estate, and third
party assignees, and it fails to account for the qualitative changes
that occur when rights transfer between these entities. As outlined
in Part I, when consumers are confronted with promotional messages related to the decedent, for example on their official social
media pages, they care whether the message reflects an authentically held belief by the decedent or perhaps by those who were
personally close to them.218 By contrast, they bristle at profiteering—exploiting the goodwill surrounding a deceased celebrity solely
for financial gain.219 For example, in one of the trademark lawsuits
initiated by Experience Hendrix, LLC, the plaintiff ’s evidence
suggested that consumers were upset about the defendant’s sale of

218. See supra Part I.A.
219. See Ross D. Petty & Denver D’Rozario, The Use of Dead Celebrities in Advertising and
Marketing: Balancing Interests in the Right of Publicity, 38 J. ADVERT. 37, 43 (2009) (“Many
people, particularly Fred Astaire fans, felt this use [of Astaire in Dirt Devil Vacuum Cleaner
Advertisement] was neither dignified nor intended to preserve his celebrity goodwill.”); Steve
Olenski, The Branding of Dead Celebrities, FORBES (June 12, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/steveolenski/2017/06/12/the-branding-of-dead-celebrities/?sh=611b4e9a6d80
[https://perma.cc/HQ76-7LSC].
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Purple Haze Liqueur and blamed it on the Hendrix estate.220 The
court quoted several angry Facebook users:
• “The Hendrix estate are a bunch of f****** vultures.”
• “So the Hendrix estate wouldn’t license music for a biopic, but
they’ll stick his face on this purple s***? Oh, ok.”
• “I wouldn’t give the Hendrix estate my p***. Do you think I’m
going to buy this f****** drink. Another disgusting moneymaking scheme from a bunch of vultures.”
• “Little tasteless and tacky on the Hendrix family to market
something like this considering his death was associated with
barbiturates and Alcoholl [sic].”221

Fans care about respectful commercial uses of the decedent’s image and responsible stewardship of their legacy by their successor.222 Accordingly, transparency about who is behind a particular
communication is important for consumers trying to ferret out the
source of a posthumous message. The case law nonetheless only
creates more opacity in this area.
Courts repeatedly interchange the decedent and their “estate,”
but an “estate” is not a clearly defined entity that provides much in
the way of useful consumer information. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines an “estate” as simply “[t]he property that one leaves after

220. See Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Tiger Paw Distribs., LLC, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d 1004, 1011
(S.D. Ga. 2016), order amended by No. CV 416-107, 2016 WL 3963079 (S.D. Ga. July 21,
2016).
221. Id. The court nonetheless downplayed this evidence of confusion because “the Court
has no evidence indicating that these Facebook users know—or would be likely to know—that
Al Hendrix ‘transferred all rights from Jimi’s estate into [Plaintiffs].’” Id. Although the court’s
reasoning here is somewhat opaque, this lawsuit was technically based upon the infringement
of the plaintiff’s registered marks in the JIMI HENDRIX name and signature, which did not
appear anywhere on the defendant’s product packaging. See id. (“Plaintiffs have not produced
any evidence indicating that members of the public have confused Tiger Paw’s product with
Plaintiffs or their trademarks.”).
222. See Petty & D’Rozario, supra note 219, at 43-44 (explaining that possible harms
caused by dead celebrity advertising include “disrespect of legacy,” “cheapening of image,” and
“dilution of image” for fans that “share the concerns of heirs” regarding the decedent’s rights
to publicity).
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death; the collective assets and liabilities of a dead person”223 and
defines “probate estate” as “[a] decedent’s property subject to administration by a personal representative.”224 Although the IRS
defines an estate as “[a] legal entity created as the result of a
person’s death.... [that] exists until the final distribution of the
assets [is] made to the heirs and other beneficiaries,”225 numerous
courts have held that an estate is not a natural or artificial person
who can sue or be sued in its own right.226 Courts in other contexts
will often use “estate” as a shorthand for “[Entity X] as the personal
representative of the Estate of [Entity Y],”227 but none of these
definitions of an estate reflect the usage present throughout posthumous endorsement law: a deceased person’s heirs or the corporate
assignees of those heirs.
Even if an estate is used more colloquially by consumers to refer
to a decedent’s surviving family members, as appears to be the case
in the Jimi Hendrix example above,228 posthumous endorsement law
largely fails to facilitate this understanding. The estates that are
lumped together with the deceased celebrity endorser sometimes include more distant relatives, such as James Dean’s cousin, who administers his estate,229 or individuals with no relationship at all to
the decedent, such as the wife of Marilyn Monroe’s acting coach,
who administered her probate estate until 2001 and sold her rights
to the Authentic Brands Group.230 Furthermore, family members’ inheritances can be alienated to third parties even prior to the closing
223. Estate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
224. Probate Estate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
225. I.R.S. IRM 3.12.14.1.6 (Jan. 1, 2020).
226. See, e.g., Spradley v. Spradley, 213 So. 3d 1042, 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (“[I]t
is well-settled that ‘an “Estate” is not an entity that can be a party to litigation. It is the
personal representative of the estate, in a representative capacity, that is the proper party.’”
(quoting Ganske v. Spence, 129 S.W.3d 701, 704 n.1 (Tex. App. 2004))); 31 AM. JUR. 2D
Executors and Administrators § 1141 (2012) (“Since estates are not natural or artificial
persons, and they lack legal capacity to sue or be sued, an action against an estate must be
brought against an administrator or executor as the representative of the estate.”).
227. See, e.g., Ganske, 129 S.W.3d at 704 n.1.
228. See Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Tiger Paw Distribs., LLC, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d 1004, 1011
(S.D. Ga. 2016), order amended by CV 416-107, 2016 WL 3963079 (S.D. Ga. July 21, 2016).
229. See Sean F. Driscoll, James Dean’s Cousin Preserving His Legacy, THE SPOKESMANREV. (Sept. 23, 2005), https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2005/sep/23/james-deans-cousinpreserving-his-legacy/ [https://perma.cc/252V-9AV4].
230. See A.V.E.L.A., Inc. v. Est. of Marilyn Monroe, LLC, 364 F. Supp. 3d 291, 308
(S.D.N.Y. 2019).
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of probate;231 for example, at least one-third of Prince’s estate is
controlled by a licensing company that purchased the inheritance
rights of other surviving siblings.232 Courts nonetheless treat an
entity named (deceptively, in this author’s view) “The Estate of
Marilyn Monroe, LLC” as an “Estate” equivalent to the surviving
spouse or children of a decedent.233
Moreover, even when the postmortem rightsholder is in fact a
close family member, the “estate” label often covers up major disagreements within the family about whether and how to commercially exploit the decedent. The families of Jimi Hendrix and
Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, have engaged in significant,
prolonged in-fighting.234 To the extent that consumers see surviving
family members as standing in for the decedent’s beliefs and values,
labeling the successors in interest to the decedent’s trademarks as
their “estate” masks the true identity of the relevant decision maker
and papers over a far more contested set of relationships behind the
scenes. Although in other trademark contexts consumers also have
no idea what is happening behind the scenes at the mark owner’s
company, in the endorsement context consumers care especially
about the personal attributes and beliefs that motivate communications by the endorser.235
The conflation of the decedent, their family members, and third
party successors within posthumous endorsement laws is mirrored
in the social media context. For example, the verification rules for
Instagram, whereby an account holder receives a coveted blue
checkmark, state that the account will be verified when Instagram
231. See David Horton & Reid Kress Weisbord, Heir Hunting, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 383, 385
(2021).
232. See Cori A. Robinson, Estate-Within-an-Estate: Navigating Prince’s Complicated Estate
Administration, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 25, 2020, 1:02 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/
2020/02/estate-within-an-estate-navigating-princes-complicated-estate-administration/
[https://perma.cc/PAR3-WQ8H].
233. See Est. of Marilyn Monroe, 364 F. Supp. 3d at 308.
234. See Peter Sheridan, Jimi Hendrix: Family Feud over Guitar Legend’s £130Million
Estate, EXPRESS (Nov. 25, 2017, 9:56 AM), https://www.express.co.uk/celebrity-news/
884185/Jimi-Hendrix-guitar-songs-death-family-feud-130-million-estate-fortune
[https://perma.cc/5PYK-Z44K]; Jenny Jarvie, Legal Feud Among Martin Luther King’s
Children on Display in Court, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2015, 6:03 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-mlk-children-lawsuit-hearing-20150113-story.html [https://perma.cc/6SHF4TVN].
235. See McGeveran, supra note 12, at 1129.
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“ha[s] confirmed that an account is the authentic presence of the
creator, public figure, celebrity, or global brand it represents.”236 In
practice, it is often impossible to know who is pulling the strings of
the verified account of a deceased celebrity.
For example, the account of James Dean is labeled as “The
Official Instagram of James Dean Managed by Representatives of
the James Dean Estate,”237 and the account of Aaliyah is labeled as
“The Official Instagram Account of Aaliyah Haughton Honoring
Her Beautiful Life and Legacy Managed by Representatives of the
Haughton Estate.”238 It is entirely unclear whether the estate “representatives” are the surviving family members who own rights in
the decedent or the licensing companies who work with rightsholders.239 Other Instagram accounts simply label themselves as
memorial sites to the decedent: for example, “Remembering
Whitney—The greatest voice of our time”240 and “Paying tribute to
the life & legacy of Muhammad Ali,”241 without any indication to
what extent the contemporary commercial messages that frequently
appear on those pages are coming from the licensing companies that
own significant stakes in the decedents’ intellectual property.242
Other verified pages, like those of Marilyn Monroe243 or Kobe
236. Verify Your Accounts on Facebook and Instagram, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.
com/business/learn/lessons/verify-facebook-instagram-account [https://perma.cc/U88K-6BE9].
237. James Dean (@jamesdean), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/jamesdean/
[https://perma.cc/UE96-U4PG].
238. Aaliyah Haughton (@aaliyah), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/aaliyah/
[https://perma.cc/D7HN-CZMN].
239. An example of a verified Instagram account that is clearly labeled is Bruce Lee’s,
which discloses “Bruce Lee’s daughter here, @therealshannonlee + The Bruce Lee Family
Company on behalf of Bruce Lee’s legacy.” Bruce Lee (@brucelee), INSTAGRAM, https://
www.instagram.com/brucelee/ [https://perma.cc/2BSC-Z29H].
240. Whitney Houston (@whitneyhouston), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/
whitneyhouston/ [https://perma.cc/2XKL-7GH5].
241. Muhammad Ali (@muhammadali), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/
muhammadali/ [https://perma.cc/E75A-XCMF].
242. See Murray Stassen, Primary Wave Music Publishing Acquires 50% Stake in Whitney
Houston Estate, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (May 20, 2019), https://www.musicbusinessworld
wide.com/primary-wave-music-publishing-partners-with-whitney-houston-estate/ [https://
perma.cc/ZL5V-HXBG]; Press Release, Authentic Brands Grp., LLC, Authentic Brands Group,
LLC Completes the Purchase of Muhammad Ali Enterprises (Nov. 19, 2013, 8:30 AM), https://
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/authentic-brands-group-llc-completes-the-purchase-ofmuhammad-ali-enterprises-232486531.html [https://perma.cc/L8BP-PNQW].
243. See Marilyn Monroe (@marilynmonroe), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/
marilynmonroe/ [https://perma.cc/X5UU-W263] (“The Official Instagram page of #Marilyn
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Bryant,244 do not even prominently indicate that the celebrity is
deceased and appear to post on contemporary issues as any living
celebrity might.
The persistent conflation, in both case law and social media, of a
decedent and their various categories of successors falsely suggests
to consumers that the decedent’s commercial goodwill has continued
postmortem when it very well may not have. As mentioned above,
trademark law’s assignment-in-gross doctrine is meant to make
sure that when rights have been transferred to a new owner, consumer associations between the mark and the core features of the
original source carry over.245 Such consumer protection concerns are
highly salient with respect to posthumous endorsement. The value
of a celebrity endorsement, as explained in Part I, comes from some
combination of their personal characteristics (such as authenticity,
credibility, and expertise) and their voluntary associations with
certain characters, music, or political causes.246 Whether these
values can seamlessly transfer over to some third party is highly
doubtful, and certainly not likely without transparent disclosure
concerning who is speaking on behalf of the decedent.247 As Professor Laura Heymann has observed, although consumers are used to
some alterations to the person or entity standing behind a name,
this assumes that “the essential qualities of the referent remain
consistent.”248 With celebrity endorsements, the essential qualities
of the referent are tied to the endorser’s particular authenticity,

Monroe”).
244. See Kobe Bryant (@kobebryant), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/kobebryant/
[https://perma.cc/BC28-Z47P] (“Writer. Producer. Investor @granity @bryantstibel @drink
bodyarmor @mambamambacitasports”).
245. See supra Part II.A; see also Heymann, supra note 122, at 1357 (“[G]oodwill is deemed
to have been transferred along with a trademark only if consumers have the same general
perceptions about the offerings and level of quality associated with the mark after the
assignment as before.”).
246. See McGeveran, supra note 12, at 1129 (“Recipients of these trusted referrals rely on
them in part precisely because of their voluntariness.”).
247. See Yvette Joy Liebesman, When Selling Your Personal Name Mark Extends to Selling
Your Soul, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (2010) (“It is most likely impossible to completely
disconnect a person from their personal identity through contract.”); see also Rothman, supra
note 163, at 1277 (supporting limits on transferability of some personal marks “when they are
inseparable from the underlying person”).
248. Laura A. Heymann, Naming, Identity, and Trademark Law, 86 IND. L.J. 381, 435, 438
(2011) (observing that the “Dear Abby” advice column has featured multiple Abby’s).
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credibility, and expertise—qualities that cannot be easily inherited
or transferred to third parties.
Other scholars have critiqued the alienability of the right of
publicity because of the necessary connection between an individual
and their name, image, or likeness.249 The arguments against the
alienability, and especially the descendibility, of endorsement rights
are even stronger. The affirmative, voluntary decision for an endorser to be associated with a third party is even more difficult to
extricate from the individual making that decision. Professor Mark
Lemley has observed that allowing the assignment of endorsement
rights to a third party makes no sense “because only the celebrity,
not an assignee, could be perceived as and confused for an endorser.”250 Having a third party control someone’s endorsements,
particularly a dead person’s endorsements, is both difficult to
conceptualize and at the very least carries the risk of consumer
confusion.251 Even if fans are willing to suspend their disbelief
concerning the source of endorsements after a celebrity’s death,
there is a qualitative difference from fans’ perspectives between
those communications emanating from a decedent’s close family
members and those emanating from private equity-backed brand
management companies.252 Trademark law muddles the meaning of
posthumous endorsement practices for the benefit of assignees and
to the detriment of consumers.
B. Discursive Problems
Posthumous endorsement rights give successors in interest
substantial power over shaping the memory of the deceased as well
as their ongoing cultural meaning. As recognized by the Meaning
249. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185,
189-90 (2012).
250. See Lemley, supra note 11, at 1173-74; see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 117, at
1216 (arguing that third parties exercising endorsement rights are “more likely to confuse
than to inform”).
251. See Heymann, supra note 248, at 439 (“Legal intervention thus seems appropriate ...
when the individual or good has been altered so significantly that the denotation is no longer
accurate.”).
252. See Annie Massa, Blackrock Acquires $875 Million Stake in Company Behind Sports
Illustrated and Juicy Couture, BRUDIRECT (Aug. 12, 2019, 10:21 AM), https://brudirect.com/
news.php?id=74100 [https://perma.cc/G4JB-VZN3].
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Transfer Model,253 as well as by numerous cultural studies of
contemporary celebrity, celebrity is a co-construction of the celebrity
individual, their fans, and a range of professional, corporate, and
institutional intermediaries.254 By centralizing endorsement rights
in whomever acquires trademark, publicity, or other intellectual
property rights from the decedent, posthumous endorsement law
places its thumb heavily on the corporate intermediary end of the
scale. This dynamic—corporate control over cultural meaning—has
been addressed by others in the context of postmortem publicity
rights,255 but discursive control is especially problematic here.
Owners of posthumous endorsement rights control not just the use
of the deceased celebrity’s name or image; they are able to control
their official “voice.” Through digital technologies and verified social media accounts, rightsholders can communicate support for
goods, services, and causes in a way that appears to emanate from
the decedent themselves.
A celebrity’s fans often carry strong emotional and psychological
attachments to the celebrity, and the primary way fans express such
attachment is through consumption of goods, services, and causes
associated with the celebrity.256 Public identification with prominent
celebrities is broadly understood to be both an act of self-definition
and a reflection of an authentic, if sometimes stigmatized, bond with
the celebrity.257 This is particularly true with members of marginalized communities that bond to certain celebrities who publicly
embrace values, such as sexual empowerment or gender fluidity,
that are otherwise hard to find in the public sphere.258 Accordingly,
those who have control over the official messaging surrounding a
deceased celebrity (particularly a recently deceased one) have the

253. See McCracken, supra note 67, at 310.
254. See, e.g., Tan, supra note 89, at 916.
255. See generally Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture
and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125 (1993).
256. See Marcela Moraes, John Gountas, Sandra Gountas & Piyush Sharma, Celebrity
Influences on Consumer Decision Making: New Insights and Research Directions, 35 J. MKTG.
MGMT. 1159, 1171 (2019).
257. See id. at 1172-75 (reviewing literature on parasocial relationships between audiences
and media personalities).
258. See Tan, supra note 89, at 949.
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ability both to shape the identities of the fans attached to them and
to commercially exploit those attachments.259
Because the death of a celebrity can be extremely financially
lucrative, rightsholders have a strong incentive to frame the decedent’s memory in marketable ways.260 For example, the official
messaging around many deceased celebrities often whitewashes
the struggles and trauma that often followed them during life.261
Whitney Houston, Marilyn Monroe, Michael Jackson, Amy Winehouse, Prince, and many other celebrities all battled different
forms of addiction,262 yet their official posthumous personae are
stripped of these demons. For example, Whitney Houston becomes
“America’s sweetheart,”263 and Marilyn Monroe becomes a timeless
sex symbol—an “icon of seductive beauty.”264 Deceased celebrities,
259. See McCracken, supra note 67, at 317 (“The celebrity is supplying not just an example
of self-creation, but the very stuff with which this difficult act is undertaken.... This makes
the celebrity very powerful indeed.”).
260. See Penfold-Mounce, supra note 98, at 494 (“The productivity of the celebrity dead is
driven by the living (family or professional management groups) who possess the celebrity as
a brand and use them as a catalyst for the production of wealth through a posthumous
celebrity career.”); Carl Öhman & Luciano Floridi, The Political Economy of Death in the Age
of Information: A Critical Approach to the Digital Afterlife Industry, 27 MINDS & MACHS. 639,
648 (2017) (“[D]igital afterlife services have an incentive to shape one’s digital remains, the
product of one’s work and online identity, according to what is profitable.”).
261. See Peggy J. Bowers & Stephanie Houston Grey, Karen: The Hagiographic Impulse
in the Public Memory of a Pop Star, in AFTERLIFE AS AFTERIMAGE, supra note 95, at 97-99,
103-07 (discussing the saint-like presentation of Karen Carpenter, and the downplaying of her
severe anorexia); Loren Cheri Shokes, Life After Death: How to Protect Artists’ Post-Mortem
Rights, 9 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 27, 34 (2018) (“One of the most hotly debated aspects of
digitally recreating Tupac for Coachella is that, in addition to interpolating words into the
performance that the actual Tupac never uttered, the masterminds that erected the show
purposefully expurgated Tupac’s more controversial lyrics.... Censoring Tupac’s lyrics without
explanation intentionally distorts and extinguishes the very aspects of his identity that made
him a household name.”).
262. See, e.g., Alan Light, How a Director Uncovered Whitney Houston’s Secret Pain, N.Y.
TIMES (July 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/13/movies/whitney-houstondocumentary. html [https://perma.cc/SK5U-VDSM]; Jordan Zakarin, Inside Amy Winehouse’s
Downward Spiral and Tragic Death, BIOGRAPHY (July 17, 2020), https://www.biography.com/
news/amy-winehouse-death [https://perma.cc/UD8N-2RGL].
263. See Sisario, supra note 24 (“Whitney was America’s sweetheart, and the idea now is
to remind people that that is what her legacy is.”).
264. See Penfold-Mounce, supra note 98, at 499; see also Andrew Adam Newman, Marilyn
Monroe’s Star Still Shines in Ad Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2013), https://
www.nytimes.com/2013/08/06/business/media/marilyn-monroes-star-still-shines-in-adcampaigns.html [https://perma.cc/Y3HA-HFJH] (“A new campaign — with the slogan ‘Styles
change. Sexy is forever.’— features photos of Monroe with quotations from her.”).
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particularly those celebrities who have become valuable commodities, are flattened into character archetypes whose “official” stories
will make the most money for their rightsholders.265
The commercial incentives surrounding a deceased celebrity also
shed new light on the political causes that deceased celebrities appear to be associated with. For example, Authentic Brand Group’s
most prominent celebrity assets—Marilyn Monroe and Elvis
Presley—have both posted support for the Black Lives Matter
movement by posting black squares on their account in June 2020
with the hashtag #BlackoutTuesday.266 Such posts reflect smart
brand management strategy; reflecting the insights of the Meaning
Transfer Model, the managers of these accounts are able to actively
associate Monroe and Presley with democracy and social activism
in a way that is likely to appeal to audiences that long postdate
them.267 However, such posts are not necessarily a representation
of truth.268 We ultimately cannot know precisely what Monroe or
Presley would think about the deaths of George Floyd or Breonna
Taylor or about how to resolve today’s voting rights disputes.269 The
Marilyn Monroe and Elvis Presley that exist today are the products
of decades of deliberate posthumous marketing, yet both are
presented to the public as active cultural voices, speaking from a
nebulous cultural purgatory in service of their rightsholders’ ongoing commercial needs.270

265. See Chloe Preece, The Authentic Celebrity Brand: Unpacking Ai Weiwei’s Celebritised
Selves, 31 J. MKTG. MGMT. 616, 627 (2015) (“[A]rchetypal characters and storylines are
attractive because they are so resonant of meanings; however, they are also inherently
ideological.”).
266. See Monroe, supra note 9.
267. See Hackley & Hackley, supra note 79, at 463.
268. See Öhman & Floridi, supra note 260, at 650 (“[C]ommercial enterprises have
economic incentives to display digital remains of the dead, their informational bodies,
primarily in accordance with what is profitable and not necessarily what is accurate.”).
269. To be fair to Monroe, the historical record does suggest that she was supportive of the
civil rights movement and made efforts to boost the careers of Black artists such as her friend
Ella Fitzgerald. See, e.g., Sara Kettler, Ella Fitzgerald and Marilyn Monroe: Inside Their
Surprising Friendship, BIOGRAPHY (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.biography.com/news/marilynmonroe-ella-fitzgerald-friendship [https://perma.cc/D4VX-48MQ]. Elvis Presley’s legacy on
issues of race is more contested. See, e.g., Peter Guralnick, How Did Elvis Get Turned into a
Racist?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/11/opinion/
11guralnick.html [https://perma.cc/9YBW-JKSP].
270. See Hackley & Hackley, supra note 79, at 464.
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C. Dignitary Problems
In addition to potential harms to consumers stemming from both
the opacity of endorsements and discursive manipulation by
rightsholders, posthumous endorsement rights can pose harms to
decedents themselves. Traditionally, the U.S. legal system has been
dismissive of posthumous harms. According to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, “[a]fter death, [an individual] is no longer a person
within our constitutional and statutory framework, and has no
rights of which he may be deprived.”271 Under what has been variously labeled the “oblivion” or “annihilation” thesis, once an individual is dead, they cannot subjectively experience injury, so they
lack the ability to be injured in a judicially cognizable way.272 Along
these lines, numerous courts have dismissed postmortem civil
claims, such as for invasion of privacy or defamation, that were
“personal” to them and accordingly expired at death.273
Several legal scholars and philosophers, however, have argued
that the dead retain legally cognizable dignitary interests, both descriptively and normatively. Professor Don Herzog, for example, has
challenged the oblivion thesis, observing that “[o]n one side, we have
ongoing social practices, centuries of legal doctrine, and endless
writing by countless thoughtful figures approving of at least some
claims of the dead. On the other, we have a metaphysical objection.”274 Professor Fred Smith strongly supports posthumous legal
rights, emphasizing that they can “promote uniquely human pursuits by protecting individuals’ memory, enforcing their will, and
accommodating their spirituality after death.”275 Privacy scholars,
in particular, have noted that a data subject need not be a living
human being to warrant protections against unfettered disclosure
271. Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 840 (5th Cir. 1979).
272. See generally Smith, supra note 31, at 1503-05 (surveying literature on oblivion
thesis); HERZOG, supra note 31, at 58 (discussing oblivion thesis).
273. See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 429 (Cal. 1979) (“[T]he plaintiff’s
right is a personal one, which does not extend to members of his family, unless, as is obviously
possible, their own privacy is invaded along with his.” (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 814-15 (4th ed. 1971))).
274. HERZOG, supra note 31, at 225. As evidence of legal doctrines supporting posthumous
claims, Herzog points to the enforceability of testamentary interests, proscriptions against
corpse desecration, and copyright claims by certain deceased artists. See id. at 58-59, 64-65,
191-92.
275. Smith, supra note 31, at 1475.
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and use of personal information.276 Even if a dead person cannot feel
pain or be emotionally scarred by posthumous events, they nonetheless retain interests in professional, personal, and cultural
projects that can be thwarted after they die.277 For example, a decedent’s once-successful business might be ruined postmortem, a
surviving child might squander a carefully saved inheritance, or a
publisher might lose a 1000-page manuscript on its way to publication.278 In other words, dead people cannot be hurt, but they can
be harmed.279
Even if an individual’s corporeal existence has ended, they nonetheless often retain a symbolic existence deserving of moral—and
legal—standing within the communities that continue in their
wake.280 As Professor Daniel Sperling explains, human existence
can persist in a nonmaterial form so long as that human subject is
recognized as being part of a continuing human community.281 He
276. See Jannice Käll, A Posthuman Data Subject? The Right to Be Forgotten and Beyond,
18 GERMAN L.J. 1145, 1148, 1151, 1157 (2017); Alberto B. Lopez, Posthumous Privacy, Decedent Intent, and Post-Mortem Access to Digital Assets, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 183, 220-24
(2016); Natalie M. Banta, Death and Privacy in the Digital Age, 94 N.C. L. REV. 927, 929-30,
949 (2016). The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation expressly leaves to
each member state whether to extend privacy protections to deceased individuals. See
Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 Apr. 2016 on the
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Council Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 27 (“This Regulation does not apply to the personal data of
deceased persons. Member States may provide for rules regarding the processing of personal
data of deceased persons.”).
277. See HERZOG, supra note 31, at 231; Martha C. Nussbaum, The Damage of Death:
Incomplete Arguments and False Consolations, in THE METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS OF DEATH:
NEW ESSAYS 25, 35 (James Stacey Taylor ed., 2013) (“[I]n many cases, events that happen
after a person’s death can—in a special way related to the interruption argument—be bad for
a person.”); see also FLORIS TOMASINI, REMEMBERING AND DISREMEMBERING THE DEAD:
POSTHUMOUS PUNISHMENT, HARM AND REDEMPTION OVER TIME 29 (2017) (“Transcendent
desires surpass the timing of our own death and, in a search for meaningfulness outside ourselves, we go beyond the self-satisfaction of meeting our needs and personal preferences in the
present moment.”).
278. See Sean Hannon Williams, Lost Life and Life Projects, 87 IND. L.J. 1745, 1748, 177374 (2012).
279. See TOMASINI, supra note 277, at 31.
280. See Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 764 (2009)
(“Recognition of posthumous legal rights gives the dead significant moral standing within our
legal system, as would be expected if lawmakers are driven by a desire to treat the dead with
dignity.”).
281. DANIEL SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 36
(2008).
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provocatively suggests that when a living person professes to “love
Socrates,” the human subject bearing the interests of Socrates “still
exists to be loved.”282 In other words, it is not biological existence
that provides moral (and potentially legal) standing to an individual; it is the ongoing existence of human relationships.283 In the
celebrity-fan context, the living maintain increasingly interactive
relationships with the dead, and decedents such as Marilyn Monroe, Whitney Houston, and Muhammad Ali very much “exist to be
loved” on social media, in movies, and via hologram performances.284
Given that posthumous rightsholders hold out deceased celebrities
as commercially and culturally relevant in contemporary life—and
that today’s consumers interact with these individuals as if they
were still living—many dead people accordingly retain a de facto
social existence worthy of being taken seriously. If biological death
does not extinguish the dead’s cultural and economic force within
living communities, it becomes harder to deny the dignitary
interests potentially implicated by posthumous activities.
Several scholars in the field of death studies have similarly
argued that new technologies are giving the dead a new form of
agency that outlives their physical bodies.285 These scholars have
argued that, through an ongoing “informational body,” the deceased
are able to maintain a contemporary cultural presence.286 Within
this framework of posthumous agency, posthumous endorsements
have been framed as a form of unauthorized “resurrection” or
modern “necromancy.”287 Deceased individuals have been revived
282. Id. at 39.
283. See id. at 42 (“The only criterion for symbolic existence is that its existing subject must
belong to the human community.... [T]he association with the human community is not
restricted by time so that both subjects who will join this community and those who have
departed from it may be potential subjects for symbolic existence.”).
284. See id. at 39; supra Part III.A.
285. See, e.g., Tero Karppi, Death Proof: On the Biopolitics and Noopolitics of
Memorializing Dead Facebook Users, 14 CULTURE MACH. 1, 15 (2013) (“[M]emorialized user
accounts and memorial pages are Facebook’s way of utilizing the dead and of granting them
agency.”); David Giles, The Immortalisation of Celebrities, in POSTMORTAL SOCIETY: TOWARDS
A SOCIOLOGY OF IMMORTALITY 97, 98 (Michael Hviid Jacobsen ed., 2017) (“If, then, the
possibility of symbolic immortality is one of the fundamental driving forces behind individuals’
desire for fame, celebrity may well be regarded as a strategy for achieving that goal.” (emphasis omitted)).
286. See, e.g., Öhman & Floridi, supra note 260, at 642; PENFOLD-MOUNCE, supra note 105,
at 1 (“The dead can, and do, have agency.”).
287. See Brady Simenson, The Picture of Marilyn Monroe: How Oscar Wilde Predicts the
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and their agency has been co-opted without their consent in order
to sell a product or promote a cause.288 If we are to take seriously the
ongoing agency of the deceased, then posthumous endorsement
practices place them in a position in which they are unable to assess
the risks of associating with a particular offering and are compelled
to speak on someone else’s behalf without regard to their ongoing
interests.289
By resurrecting individuals for commercial purposes without
their consent, entities holding posthumous endorsement rights
can undermine the dignity of the deceased.290 For example, Marilyn
Monroe and Muhammad Ali appear in advertisements for
Snickers291 and Gatorade292 respectively, and numerous deceased
Frightening Afterlife of the Dead Celebrity Persona, 7 POPULAR CULTURE STUD. J. 39, 39
(2019) (“As technology has developed, however, family estates and production companies have
gained even more potential control over dead celebrity personas. No longer is this a mere issue of images, works, and names being used after death, but now the issue has expanded to
an almost complete resurrection of the persona itself.”); Sherlock, supra note 96, at 171 (“One
might perhaps consider the technicians who created the Bob Monkhouse advertisement as
modern necromancers—reanimating the digital remains of the deceased Monkhouse to impart
his knowledge concerning his own death.”).
288. See Boeuf & Darveau, supra note 105, at 1078 (“[N]ecro-advertising associates a brand
with individuals (i.e., the delebs) who cannot give their consent for the use of their image.”).
289. See McKenna, supra note 122, at 286-87 (discussing issues of compelled speech and
Kantian concerns with someone speaking on behalf of another).
290. See Rothman, supra note 163, at 1326-27 (“Losing control over personal marks, particularly ones that are inseparable from the underlying identity-holder, can work fundamental
injuries to a person’s autonomy and dignity.”). Although the argument here is framed largely
in terms of questions of agency and free will, these dignitary issues might also be framed in
terms of anti-commodification principles, whereby posthumous endorsement improperly
treats deceased individuals as fungible market commodities—purchased and sold as means
of achieving the commercial needs of their owners. See generally Margaret Jane Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). Several aspects of the anti-commodification critique seem to apply to posthumous endorsement, for example the alienation of
individuals from aspects of themselves that are integral to their personhood (such as their
associational choices) and the flattening of a person’s individuality to meet the needs of the
market. See, e.g., Tan, supra note 89, at 951-52 (referring to the “colonization of the veridical
self” through the creation of celebrity); Mark Verstraete, Inseparable Uses, 99 N.C. L. REV.
427, 448 (2021) (“[W]hen a person is used through uses of a thing that is connected to them,
it risks treating that person as merely a means to an end, undermining their inherent dignity.”); Sherlock, supra note 96, at 167 (referring to the creation of “soulless artifact[s]”).
291. See Snickers, Snickers Super Bowl 2016 Commercial William Dafoe Marilyn Monroe,
YOUTUBE (May 22, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RLAATrRjxCE [https://perma.cc/
FM4F-NQMS].
292. See Gatorade Launches Champions Edition Collectors’ Bottles, BEVERAGE INDUS. (July
23, 2021), https://www.bevindustry.com/ articles/94286-gatorade-launches-champions-editioncollectors-bottles [https://perma.cc/Q6HK-QLVR].
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celebrities have been tasked with promoting cloth face masks during
the COVID-19 pandemic, receiving criticism at times from followers
who object either to commercializing a public health crisis or to the
politics of mask-wearing itself.293 For example, in response to a post
on pinup icon Bettie Page’s Instagram page promoting face masks,
one user responded “[s]he represents freedom she wouldn’t like
church closed.”294 Living celebrities are able to assess the potential
risks and benefits of associating themselves with products that (for
better or worse) have taken on a political meaning in a politically
polarized culture; deceased celebrities are not given this opportunity.295 Instead, deceased celebrities are frequently forced to stand
behind the commercial and political messages that their acquirers
support.
Although the dead cannot themselves march into court and seek
an injunction against activities they oppose, the legal system routinely recognizes the interests of other individuals—such as children and persons with cognitive disabilities—who are also unable to
protect their interests without a surrogate decision maker.296 The
dignitary interests of the deceased undeniably raise concerns over
the duration of posthumous rights, but the question of how to cabin
such rights should be distinguished from whether such dignitary
concerns are raised at all. Moreover, it should be noted that all
trademarks are potentially perpetual in duration: so long as a name,
word, or symbol continues to function as an indication of source,
sponsorship, or approval, trademark law will recognize consumer
reliance on such functions.297 As demonstrated throughout this Article, an individual’s endorsement can similarly remain culturally

293. See, e.g., Bob Ross (@bobross_thejoyofpainting), INSTAGRAM (Aug. 14, 2020),
https://www.instagram.com/p/CD38YMBgOIg/ [https://perma.cc/YJ9V-N8K3] (comment by
user @cooperbcarr regarding Bob Ross face masks).
294. See Bettie Page (@bettiepage), INSTAGRAM (May 29, 2020), https://www.instagram.
com/p/CAyByNehJG5/ [https://perma.cc/RG89-QFT3] (comment by @realvintageswag).
295. See McKenna, supra note 122, at 287 (emphasizing the importance of being “able to
weigh the risks of their association”); Kerry Barrett, Note, Mad Men and Dead Men:
Justification for Regulation of Computer-Generated Images of Deceased Celebrity Endorsers,
65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 561, 580 (2017) (“Digitally resurrected CGI endorsers lack discretion as
to whether or not to appear in the advertisement and lend their credibility to the product.”).
296. See Smolensky, supra note 280, at 764.
297. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (noting that
“trademarks may be renewed in perpetuity”).
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and commercially material for many decades after their death.298
Posthumous dignitary interests are accordingly not incompatible
with a functioning trademark system, so long as there is both meaningful continuity in decision-making postmortem and appropriate
guardrails in place—such as a fiduciary relationship— to protect the
dead’s ongoing interests.299
To the extent that the dead have agency in an increasingly
digitized society, by necessity the living will mobilize it.300 In today’s
legal landscape, however, this mobilization is not driven by the
decedent’s own wishes or by any obligation on behalf of successors
to respectfully steward their legacy. It is entirely driven by the
demands of the marketplace and the chain of title that places the
decedent in the hands of the highest bidder. If trademark law allows
any form of exclusive posthumous endorsement rights, there needs
to be safeguards in place that better tie the commercial and political
activities of the decedent to their ongoing cultural agency.
D. Some Modest Defenses
The previous Sections set forth potential harms that can result
from centralizing posthumous rights in family members or other
successors in interest. Exclusive posthumous endorsement rights
have the potential to deceive fans who are vulnerable to commercial
exhortations and to undermine the dignity of the decedent themselves. This does not mean, however, that posthumous endorsement
should be a fully unregulated space. There are instead a few reasons—from both consumer protection and dignitary perspectives—
to place some legal limits on the market practices of posthumous
endorsement.
First, consumers may need protection from overtly deceptive
statements about the relationship between a brand, a deceased
celebrity, and their family members. For example, at the same time
298. Professor Sperling notes along these lines that the duration of a person’s symbolic
existence hinges on “their durability in the minds of others.” SPERLING, supra note 281, at
246.
299. See infra Part IV.
300. See PENFOLD-MOUNCE, supra note 105, at 11 (“[T]he agency of the dead ... is mobilised
by the living who ‘own’ them.”); see also RAYMOND ANGELO BELLIOTTI, POSTHUMOUS HARM:
WHY THE DEAD ARE STILL VULNERABLE 171 (2012) (observing that a person’s “transcendent
interests are held in trust by proxies and guardians ... by the surviving moral community”).
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that Black Lives Matter protests grew around the country during
May and June 2020, merchandise featuring the names of George
Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and others propagated online.301 Some of this
merchandise purported to be “official,”302 suggesting that there was
some connection between the seller and the families of victims of
police violence.
To the extent that there are thousands of potential consumers
who are strongly motivated by the deaths of these individuals and
eager to support their grieving families, the risk of consumer
deception and unfair competition is quite significant. Some of these
concerns might be channeled into false advertising law, which
provides standing to competitors injured by the falsity,303 but there
is a plausible argument that the Floyd family should be allowed to
play a gatekeeping role to the commercial elements of the Black
Lives Matter movement. Recall from the discussion of posthumous
endorsement practices in Part I that consumers often care quite a
bit whether a commercial offering is associated with a decedent’s
family or is instead purely profit-motivated.304
Existing Lanham Act jurisprudence may make it difficult to prevent this type of commercial piggybacking off the postmortem fame
of the victims of police violence. Most courts have required that the
alleged endorser have commercialized, or at least established some
sort of commercial value, during their lives, and they have rejected
false endorsement claims by surviving family members in the
absence of such a showing.305 Notwithstanding efforts by some of
301. See Peter, supra note 36.
302. See, e.g., ShirtsByPRINTBOD, George Floyd I Can’t Breathe Official Shirts—Black
Lives Matter, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/listing/802114188/george-floyd-i-cant-breatheofficial [https://perma.cc/P838-9DNK]; Official Justice for George Floyd T-Shirt, GEMINI
PREMIUM, https://geminipremium.com/product/official-justice-for-george-floyd-t-shirt/ [https://
perma.cc/N953-D8NZ]; Stand with George Floyd: Official Merchandise, BONFIRE,
https://www.bonfire.com/store/stand-with-george-floyd/ [https://perma.cc/524E-SHGK] (listing
“Official Merchandise,” the proceeds of which “will be donated to BLM or George Floyd’s
family”).
303. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 131-40
(2014); see also Barrett, supra note 295, at 569-72 (arguing that use of posthumous endorsements via CGI technologies are deceptive under the FTC’s endorsement and testimonials
guidelines).
304. See supra Part I.B.
305. See, e.g., Brooks ex rel. Est. of Bell v. Topps Co., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1361, 1367-68 (S.D.N.Y.
2007). See generally CHARLES E. MCKENNEY & GEORGE F. LONG III, 1 FEDERAL UNFAIR
COMPETITION: LANHAM ACT 43(A) § 7:5 (rev. ed. 2021) (“While some cases have held that the
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these families to obtain a trademark in their loved one’s name,306 or
the observation by some IP scholars that everyone has a dignitary
interest in not being falsely presented as an endorser,307 trademark
law’s privileging of lifetime fame may undercut the potential for
posthumous endorsement law to protect consumers, the deceased,
and their families.
Second, posthumous endorsement law, if better calibrated, could
be an effective way of protecting the agency of the deceased by
limiting the ability of the living to conscript them into activities they
did not support, or demonstrably would not have supported. This
concern is especially salient in the political context, when the families of deceased celebrities and public figures have objected to the
inclusion of the decedent’s image or voice in campaign fundraising.308 Although Lanham Act jurisprudence is split as to whether
political fundraising is an actionable “use in commerce,”309 placing
a deceased individual behind a cause without their consent both
strongly triggers posthumous dignitary concerns and alters the
constellation of cultural meanings surrounding the decedent. Each
of these dynamics comes with potential detriment to the decedent,
their fans, and their desired political and commercial associations.
Giving standing to certain family members, or a decedent’s chosen
steward, might better recognize and protect the ongoing interests of
the deceased.

attainment of popularity or celebrity may be a condition precedent for a successful false
endorsement claim under the Lanham Act, there is a significant body of case law developing
with respect to this issue.” (footnote omitted)).
306. For example, the mother of Elijah McClain, who died at the hands of the Aurora,
Colorado police, applied to register McClain’s name as a trademark with the state of Colorado.
See Gliha, supra note 36.
307. See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 117, at 1211 (arguing that noncelebrities should
be able to stop confusing uses of their names).
308. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
309. Compare Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (rejecting
argument by the Republican National Committee that Lanham Act Section 43(a) does not
apply to political speech), with Nichols v. Club for Growth Action, 235 F. Supp. 3d 289, 297-98
(D.D.C. 2017) (rejecting Browne and holding that the Lanham Act does not apply to “political
speech expressing a point of view”).

2022]

ENDORSING AFTER DEATH

1589

IV. POTENTIAL REFORM
Given the problems with existing posthumous endorsement law
and recognizing the need to regulate growing use of digital resurrection technologies for commercial purposes, this Part suggests a new
framework for approaching posthumous endorsements. It moves
away from the existing framework, which (1) conflates the deceased
individual with those who have purchased their intellectual property and (2) disconnects postmortem decision-making from the
decedent’s agency. There are accordingly two missing components
in the developing law of posthumous endorsement: transparency
and stewardship.
A. Disentangling Posthumous Endorsers
It is important that courts—and ideally social media platforms—
become much more rigorous and transparent about both who is
actually asserting endorsement rights and who consumers perceive
as making a particular endorsement. In other words, trademark law
needs to stop conflating the decedent with the decedent’s surviving
family members, with the personal representative of the decedent’s
probate estate, and with the licensing companies that purchase the
decedent’s rights. Consumers can be sensitive, in very different
ways, to communications from each of these entities,310 yet trademark law lumps these entities together when assessing likelihood
of endorsement confusion.311 Some courts, for example, have allowed
rightsholders to submit consumer survey evidence about perceptions
of authorization from the decedent, “his heirs, estate, or agents.”312
If courts were to disambiguate these entities both in their opinions
and in the evidence they admit, false endorsement jurisprudence
310. See McGeveran, supra note 12, at 1129.
311. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
312. See, e.g., Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 778 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th
Cir. 2015) (accepting survey that asked whether merchandise received permission from “Bob
Marley/the person on the shirt or his heirs, estate, or agents”); see also A.V.E.L.A., Inc. v. Est.
of Marilyn Monroe, LLC, 364 F. Supp. 3d 291, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (rejecting argument “that
the Estate’s survey is irrelevant, because respondents did not identify the Estate by name,
but rather made statements suggesting Ms. Monroe or people around her endorsed the
shirts”).
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would better reflect consumers’ actual perceptions and be more
firmly moored to the consumer protection commitments of trademark and unfair competition laws.
By teasing out these different entities, courts could better identify
circumstances in which, from the perspective of the consumer, there
has been a qualitative break in the received meaning of the deceased celebrity’s endorsement. When consumers perceive that the
appearance of a deceased celebrity in an advertisement signals a
partnership with the decedent or the decedent’s close family members, but the entity claiming false endorsement is an unrelated
third party assignee, the consumer may be materially misled.313
When there is a change in the fundamental character of the entity
behind a name or image, trademark law typically requires the new
entity to stand on its own two feet and start anew in building up
consumer goodwill.314 Given that endorsements are impactful due to
their underlying voluntariness,315 if the entity making endorsement decisions is not the entity perceived by consumers as making
those decisions, then the rightsholder has no legitimate claim to
step in and prevent consumer confusion.
Accordingly, the conflation of rightsholders within posthumous
endorsement law perpetuates consumer confusion. If a consumer
buys a t-shirt, manufactured by Company Z, with Muhammad Ali’s
image on it, and consumers perceive Ali’s family as the party
endorsing this t-shirt, there is no compelling reason why Authentic
Brands Group (who owns Ali’s rights)316 should be able to seek
damages from Company Z. Authentic Brands Group’s decisions
about what products it voluntary supports is immaterial to consumers, who think that Ali’s family still makes endorsement decisions. Giving Authentic Brands Group posthumous endorsement
may just privilege its own deceptive endorsement practices over
those of third parties.

313. See, e.g., Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Tiger Paw Distribs., LLC, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d 1004,
1011 (S.D. Ga. 2016), order amended by No. CV 416-107, 2016 WL 3963079 (S.D. Ga. July 21,
2016).
314. See Ronald B. Coolley, How to Transfer Trademarks when Business Ownership
Changes, 32 PRAC. LAW. 13, 15 (1986).
315. See McGeveran, supra note 12, at 1129.
316. See Bond, supra note 62.
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B. From “Chain of Title” to “Privity and Power”
The only reason that courts recognize that entities with no relationship to the decedent have standing to challenge third parties’
false suggestions of endorsement is that they can trace their chain
of title in the relevant trademark, publicity rights, and/or copyright
interests back to the decedent.317 This is not nearly enough to
achieve what should be the twin goals of any posthumous endorsement regime: (1) protect consumers with continuing attachments
from confusion and exploitation; and (2) respect the dignity of the
deceased. Nowhere in the current formulation of posthumous endorsement rights is there any meaningful notion of stewardship;
that is, an understanding that posthumous endorsements entail
decision-making on behalf of the deceased with respect to their
ongoing interactions with living consumers.318 Although many
posthumous rightsholders undoubtedly take their stewardship
responsibilities very seriously,319 there are few formal guardrails in
place to ensure that rightsholders uphold the decedent’s express
wishes or at least attempt to further the interests of the decedent
and their surviving communities.320
To bring a more explicit element of stewardship into this area of
law, this Article proposes that an entity should only have standing
to assert a claim for false endorsement, infringement of an inherited selfmark, or cancellation of a trademark under Lanham Act
section 2(a) if it has both “privity” and “power.” The “privity” requirement captures the chain of title concern present in existing
317. See supra Part II.A.
318. See Gilden, supra note 39, at 340 (“Unlike traditional questions of planning and
inheritance, which require choosing a particular beneficiary and tailoring investment
decisions based on the characteristics of that beneficiary, stewardship is the active, ongoing
art of managing the relationship between that person, their family, and the many
stakeholders who interact with the person and their digital trail.” (footnote omitted)).
319. See, e.g., Gilden, supra note 28, at 669-76 (surveying numerous examples of family
members equating their ownership and enforcement of inherited intellectual property with
both the continuity of their loved ones’ life projects and the protection of their posthumous
legacy).
320. See Boeuf & Darveau, supra note 104, at 1079 (“[T]he nature of a posthumous
association with a brand remains relatively ambiguous due to the general lack of consent
[from dead celebrities] surrounding the publicity rights of their images.”); see also BELLIOTTI,
supra note 300, at 171 (observing that a decedent’s “transcendent interests ... are held in trust
by the surviving moral community”).
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law321 and requires that the plaintiff has title to the name, symbol,
image, persona, or work that the defendant is using to suggest
endorsement. The “power” requirement, however, substantially
limits the scope of false endorsement rights to only those entities
that are legally entitled to make decisions on behalf of the deceased,
subject to duties of loyalty and prudence. Endorsements involve the
voluntary choice to associate with a good, service, or cause,322 and
the only way that a dead person can coherently be said to endorse
something is when they are survived by a surrogate decision maker
who is tasked with acting on their behalf.
Thankfully, the legal system already provides numerous avenues
for establishing posthumous decisional surrogacy. A decedent can
charge an executor or trustee with a wide array of posthumous
decisions,323 and a court can appoint an estate administrator in the
absence of a will or trust.324 In each of these scenarios, the appointed
surrogate is bound by fiduciary duties to place the interests of the
decedent over their own, and with these structures in place, they
are empowered to make some very sensitive personal decisions
regarding the decedent. For example, an estate representative can
consent to: the release of medical information under HIPAA;325 the
disclosure of the decedent’s email account under the Stored
Communications Act;326 the waiver of attorney-client, doctor-patient,
and therapist-patient privileges;327 and the search of a home under
321. See, e.g., A.V.E.L.A., Inc. v. Est. of Marilyn Monroe, LLC, 364 F. Supp. 3d 291, 304,
311 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
322. See McGeveran, supra note 12, at 1127.
323. See Executor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Trustee, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
324. See Administrator, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
325. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(1) (2021) (“[A] covered entity must, except as provided in
paragraphs (g)(3) and (g)(5) of this section, treat a personal representative as the individual
for purposes of this subchapter.”).
326. See Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 84 N.E.3d 766, 768 (Mass. 2017).
327. See, e.g., Mayorga v. Tate, 752 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (App. Div. 2002) (per curiam) (“[J]ust
as the attorney-client privilege itself survives the death of the client for whose benefit the
privilege exists, the right to waive that privilege in the interest of the deceased client’s estate
also survives, and may be exercised by the decedent’s personal representative.” (citations
omitted)); Dist. Att’y for Norfolk Dist. v. Magraw, 628 N.E.2d 24, 27 (Mass. 1994) (“[W]aiver
of the privilege may be in the patient’s estate’s best interest when the patient is deceased, just
as it may be in her own best interest while she is living. We hold that the psychotherapistpatient privilege may be waived by the administrator or executor of the estate of the deceased
patient.”); McDonald v. McDonald, 192 N.W.2d 903, 911 (Wis. 1972) (“[T]he physician-patient
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the Fourth Amendment.328 Again, such decisions must typically be
made in light of the decedent’s best interests329 and in accordance
with the decedent’s express instructions, when available.330
If standing in false endorsement cases were limited to those
entities which are legally empowered to make decisions on behalf
of the deceased—typically entities subject to a fiduciary obligation—the results would change in some, but not all, of the cases
surveyed in Part II. In many of the posthumous endorsement cases,
there is already a fiduciary obligation in place requiring an appointed trustee, chosen executor, or court-appointed administrator
to act in accordance with the decedent’s express wishes and/or best
interests.331 Deviations from such duties of loyalty may be difficult
to enforce as a practical matter, but they nonetheless constrain the
rightsholder from prioritizing their own financial interests. In other
cases, however, the transfer of endorsement rights (or related IP) to
third parties severs the functional connection between the decedent’s agency and the posthumous decision maker. For example,
where the probate estate of a decedent, such as Marilyn Monroe,
closes and the decedent’s assets are transferred to an independent
entity, that independent entity has no obligation to consider the
interests of the decedent.332 Such third-party transferees, who lack
any formal legal tie to the decedent, do not meaningfully represent
privilege of a deceased person is held by his personal representative ... and extends to medical
reports of an attending physician.” (citing Leusink v. O’Donnell, 39 N.W.2d 675 (Wis. 1949))).
328. See United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297, 303-04 (6th Cir. 2005).
329. See United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 707 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A personal
representative of a deceased client generally may waive the client’s attorney-client privilege,
however, only when the waiver is in the interest of the client’s estate and would not damage
the client’s reputation.”), aff’d, 533 F. App’x 674 (8th Cir. 2013); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(5)
(2021) (“[A] covered entity may elect not to treat a person as the personal representative of
an individual if ... [t]he covered entity, in the exercise of professional judgment, decides that
it is not in the best interest of the individual to treat the person as the individual’s personal
representative.”).
330. See UNIF. TR. CODE § 801 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (“The trustee shall administer the
trust in good faith, in accordance with its terms and purposes.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 76(1) (AM. L. INST. 2007) (“[T]he trustee has a duty to administer the trust, diligently
and in good faith, in accordance with the terms of the trust and applicable law.”).
331. See, e.g., Branca v. Mann, 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1993, 1999 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (lawsuit by
chosen executor of Michael Jackson’s estate against unauthorized tribute websites); Est. of
Barré v. Carter, 272 F. Supp. 3d 906 (E.D. La. 2017) (lawsuit by sole heir and administrator
of Messy Mya’s intestate estate against Beyoncé).
332. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 116.213 (2021) (stating that the discharge of the personal
representative “operates as a release of the personal representative from further duties”).
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the agency of the decedent and accordingly cannot signal to consumers the perceived voluntary associations inherent in celebrity
endorsements. This limitation does not, however, render posthumous endorsement rights entirely inalienable. For example, estate
assets can be transferred to a third party in trust, subject to obligations to continue the fiduciary management in the best interests
of the decedent.333 Even without a trust or formal fiduciary role, the
transferee could potentially agree via contract to take on the duty
of loyalties that constrain their predecessors in interest.334 And to
the extent that the “privity and power” framework disincentivizes
large acquisitions undertaken by companies like Authentic Brands
Group or Primary Wave, it does nothing to prevent these companies
from working closely as advisors, agents, or managers to trustees,
executors, or other estate representatives.335
The primary goal of the “privity and power” framework is to
channel questions of endorsement more squarely into estate planning. Lawyers and scholars in the estate planning field increasingly
recognize the importance of explicitly planning for the digital
afterlife, for example by identifying who will inherit and control
social media accounts postmortem.336 This chosen steward will often
be forced to make difficult decisions concerning questions of privacy
and other ongoing dignitary interests, and one of the goals of estate
333. See, e.g., Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson, 795 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015)
(discussing Ray Charles’ transfer of his entire probate estate into a charitable foundation
designed to “fulfill the wishes of Ray Charles”).
334. See, e.g., Gregory Klass, What if Fiduciary Obligations Are like Contractual Ones?, in
CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 93, 93 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016)
(“Parties can, by and large, contract for whatever first-order obligations they wish, including
fiduciary ones.”).
335. These licensing entities already claim to work closely with the estate of the decedents
whose rights they acquire. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 63 (“I am awed that Primary Wave has
been chosen by the estate of James Brown to partner with the Godfather of Soul[.]”).
Moreover, to the extent that these acquisitions center on other valuable assets, such as
decedents’ copyright interests, the proposed framework would leave undisturbed the management of those assets, which are more easily separated conceptually from the decedent than
are endorsement rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (“The ownership of a copyright may be
transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may
be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate
succession.”).
336. See, e.g., Natalie M. Banta, Electronic Wills and Digital Assets: Reassessing Formality
in the Digital Age, 71 BAYLOR L. REV. 547, 549-51 (2019); Gerry W. Beyer & Naomi Cahn,
When You Pass on, Don’t Leave the Passwords Behind: Planning for Digital Assets, 26 PROB.
& PROP. 40, 41-43 (2012).

2022]

ENDORSING AFTER DEATH

1595

planning in this context is to get the decedent to lay down instructions that will guide posthumous decisions about often emotionally
and culturally complex topics.337 Posthumous endorsement would
ideally be treated as another piece of the digital afterlife puzzle.
There are a few well-publicized examples of individuals expressly
incorporating questions of posthumous endorsement into their estate plan.338 First, when Fred Astaire died in 1987, his will set forth
detailed instructions to his surviving spouse and executor.339 Although she received immense criticism, the endorsements she permitted could be reasonably construed as an extension of her late
husband’s free will.340 Second, when actor, philanthropist, and salad
dressing spokesperson Paul Newman died in 2008, his will transferred his intellectual property rights to the Newman’s Own Foundation with instructions to prevent uses he “did not approve during
[his] lifetime” and not to use his image to promote low-quality
foods.341 Third, when Robin Williams died in 2014, he funded a trust
with his name and image rights and instructed the trustee not to
authorize any commercial relationships for twenty-five years.342 If
the trustee were to enter into an endorsement deal, they would be
in violation of their fiduciary duties and subject to liability or removal; by contrast, if an advertiser were to use Williams’ image in
a deceptive manner, the trustee should have standing to sue for
false endorsement. And fourth, following the death of Herman Cain
337. See Gilden, supra note 39, at 335-40.
338. For a related discussion of the use of estate planning by artists to control their
posthumous legacy, see Eva E. Subotnik, Artistic Control After Death, 92 WASH. L. REV. 253,
266-75 (2017).
339. Denver D’Rozario & Guang Yang, The History and Evolution of the Market for ‘Delebs’
(Dead Celebrities), 8 ATL. MKTG. J. 1, 17 (2019), https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1259&context=amj [https://perma.cc/F7FC-4LQW].
340. See id.
341. See Alison Leigh Cowan, Paul Newman, Philanthropist, Does Hereby Leave..., N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2018, 2:13 PM), https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/26/paul-new
man-philanthropist-does-hereby-leave/ [https://perma.cc/R48Z-XMNG]; Julie Garber, Paul
Newman’s Last Will and Testament, LIFE & TIMES HOLLYWOOD (Mar. 16, 2018), https://
thelifeandtimesofhollywood.com/alzheimers-disease-has-robbed-actress-joanne-woodward-ofher-fondest-memories-while-her-family-feuds-over-her-billion-dollar-estate-also-paulnewmans-last-will-and-testament/ [https://perma.cc/VP4A-4CS4].
342. See Eriq Gardner, Robin Williams Restricted Exploitation of His Image for 25 Years
After Death, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Mar. 30, 2015, 11:45 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/
business/business-news/robin-williams-restricted-exploitation-his-785292/
[https://perma.cc/J7HE-XP6L].
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during the summer of 2020, his social media accounts were transferred to several family members, who continued to post highly
political messages from his Twitter account.343 Although they received criticism for some of these messages, it appears that Cain’s
estate plan provided for this shift in decision-making authority.344
Moreover, Cain’s family was far more transparent than other successors in interest have been following a transfer in social media
accounts,345 acting with relative transparency about who continues
to post from Cain’s account. These are all examples of decedents
using estate planning techniques to control their commercial afterlife and posthumously exert their agency on their own behalves.346
By channeling posthumous endorsement rights through estate
planning—and limiting standing to those who have the authority to
act on the decedent’s behalf—trademark and unfair competition
laws can better ensure that everyone is protected against nonconsensual conscription into posthumous commercial activity. Instead
of requiring, as some courts have, that the decedent establish a lifetime commercial interest in their persona, the “privity and power”
framework would allow surviving family members of an individual
with sudden posthumous fame—such as in the Black Lives Matter
context—to initiate a false endorsement lawsuit upon receiving
appointment as a personal representative.347 This representative
would not have the benefit of explicit instructions on how to make
endorsement decisions as they might if they were chosen via the
decedent’s will, but they would nonetheless be constrained to act in
the best interests of the decedent and surviving family members. If
an individual wants to both set forth binding instructions on
343. See Travis M. Andrews, The Curious Saga of the Deceased Herman Cain’s Living
Twitter Account, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2020/08/31/herman-cain-twitter-account/ [https://perma.cc/A762-6V9Q].
344. See id. See generally Tamara Kneese, Herman Cain and the Problems with Tweeting
After Death, SLATE (Aug. 18, 2020, 1:55 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/08/hermancain-death-twitter.html [https://perma.cc/D2XH-R3XJ].
345. See supra Part III.A.
346. See PENFOLD-MOUNCE, supra note 105, at 35 (“[D]ead celebrities can remain in control
and exert their agency for themselves by leaving strict instructions regarding how they wish
their posthumous career to be conducted.”).
347. See, e.g., Est. of Barré v. Carter, 272 F. Supp. 3d 906, 912-13 (E.D. La. 2017) (sister
of deceased rapper opened probate and obtained fiduciary appointment in order to bring a
false endorsement claim against Beyoncé Knowles-Carter, who prominently used the
decedent’s voice in her hit song “Formation”).
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posthumous endorsements and ensure that there is an individual
with standing to assert false endorsement claims for an extended
(and in some states, perpetual)348 period of time, transferring endorsement rights to a trustee would ensure that there is an entity
legally tied to, and constrained by, the wishes of the decedent long
after they die.
The privity and power framework would not just extend the
decedent’s agency into their social afterlife; it might also signal the
appropriate endpoint of such postmortem agency. When there is no
longer any entity who meaningfully stands in the shoes of the
decedent for purposes of deciding where, when, and how they should
appear in culture, commerce, and politics, then this absence
strongly indicates that a shift into the public domain is appropriate.
This shift would allow everyone to remember, celebrate, and criticize a departed figure, removing any reasonable belief that the
decedent voluntarily associated with a posthumous offering.349
Moreover, where there is no living steward representing the
interests of the deceased, it suggests that the line between a
“celebrity of our own times” and a “historical figure” has been
crossed,350 and that the justification for centralizing false endorsement oversight in a single private entity has disappeared.
CONCLUSION
The dead have never been more alive. With advances in digital
technologies and the proliferation of social media accounts, the
death of an individual no longer means an end to their active, ongoing, day-to-day presence. But the dead, in their current digital
form, are inextricably dependent upon the living to usher them
through the culture they leave behind. Normally when an individual is vulnerable to and dependent on the decision-making of others,
the legal system imposes some sort of obligation on the empowered
decision maker to act in the vulnerable party’s best interest.
Posthumous endorsement law, by contrast, channels decisions
348. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).
349. See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding no
likelihood of endorsement confusion where there was a flood of official and unofficial Princess
Diana merchandise on the market both before and after her death).
350. See discussion of Hemingway and Da Vinci, supra Part II.C.
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around the decedent’s official posthumous communications to
whatever entity obtains the decedent’s IP rights, and it places no
substantive responsibilities upon that entity. The result is a system
of posthumous endorsement that pays little heed to the dignity of
the deceased or to the desire for surviving fans to maintain emotional and psychological bonds with them. Only if posthumous
endorsements were made more transparent, were the result of deliberate decision-making, and were entrusted to individuals closely
connected to the decedent could they constitute part of a thriving
digital afterlife.

